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ABSTRACT
Privacy Protecting Biometric Authentication Systems
As biometrics gains popularity and proliferates into the daily life, there is an
increased concern over the loss of privacy and potential misuse of biometric data
held in central repositories. The major concerns are about i) the use of biometrics to
track people, ii) non-revocability of biometrics (eg. if a fingerprint is compromised
it can not be canceled or reissued), and iii) disclosure of sensitive information such
as race, gender and health problems which may be revealed by biometric traits. The
straightforward suggestion of keeping the biometric data in a user owned token (eg.
smart cards) does not completely solve the problem, since malicious users can claim
that their token is broken to avoid biometric verification altogether. Put together,
these concerns brought the need for privacy preserving biometric authentication
methods in the recent years.
In this dissertation, we survey existing privacy preserving biometric systems and
implement and analyze fuzzy vault in particular; we propose a new privacy preserv-
ing approach; and we study the discriminative capability of online signatures as it
relates to the success of using online signatures in the available privacy preserving
biometric verification systems. Our privacy preserving authentication scheme com-
bines multiple biometric traits to obtain a multi-biometric template that hides the
constituent biometrics and allows the possibility of creating non-unique identifiers
for a person, such that linking separate template databases is impossible. We pro-
vide two separate realizations of the framework: one uses two separate fingerprints
of the same individual to obtain a combined biometric template, while the other one
combines a fingerprint with a vocal pass-phrase. We show that both realizations of
the framework are successful in verifying a person’s identity given both biometric
traits, while preserving privacy (i.e. biometric data is protected and the combined
identifier can not be used to track people).
The Fuzzy Vault emerged as a promising construct which can be used in pro-
tecting biometric templates. It combines biometrics and cryptography in order to
get the benefits of both fields; while biometrics provides non-repudiation and con-
venience, cryptography guarantees privacy and adjustable levels of security. On the
other hand, the fuzzy vault is a general construct for unordered data, and as such, it
is not straightforward how it can be used with different biometric traits. In the scope
of this thesis, we demonstrate realizations of the fuzzy vault using fingerprints and
online signatures such that authentication can be done while biometric templates
are protected. We then demonstrate how to use the fuzzy vault for secret sharing,
using biometrics. Secret sharing schemes are cryptographic constructs where a se-
cret is split into shares and distributed amongst the participants in such a way that
it is reconstructed/revealed only when a necessary number of share holders come
together (e.g. in joint bank accounts). The revealed secret can then be used for
encryption or authentication. Finally, we implemented how correlation attacks can
be used to unlock the vault; showing that further measures are needed to protect
the fuzzy vault against such attacks.
The discriminative capability of a biometric modality is based on its unique-
ness/entropy and is an important factor in choosing a biometric for a large-scale
deployment or a cryptographic application. We present an individuality model for
online signatures in order to substantiate their applicability in biometric authentica-
tion. In order to build our model, we adopt the Fourier domain representation of the
signature and propose a matching algorithm. The signature individuality is mea-
sured as the probability of a coincidental match between two arbitrary signatures,
where model parameters are estimated using a large signature database. Based
on this preliminary model and estimated parameters, we conclude that an average
online signature provides a high level of security for authentication purposes.
Finally, we provide a public online signature database along with associated
testing protocols that can be used for testing signature verification systems.
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O¨zet
Kis¸isel Gizlilig˘i Sag˘layan Biyometrik Dog˘rulama Sistemleri
Biyometrik sistemlere rag˘betin artması ve gu¨nlu¨k hayatımızın bir parc¸ası haline
gelmeleriyle birlikte, bu tu¨r sistemlerde kis¸isel gizlilik ihlali ile ilgili olan endis¸elerin
de arttıg˘ını go¨zlemlemekteyiz. O¨zellikle merkezi veritabanlarında saklanan biy-
ometrik verilerin amac¸ dıs¸ı kullanılabiliyor olması kaygıları iyice ko¨ru¨klemektedir.
Biyometrik verilerle ilgili ana endis¸eleri s¸u s¸ekilde o¨zetlemek mu¨mku¨ndu¨r: i) kis¸ileri
takip etme amac¸lı kullanılmaları, ii) geri do¨nu¨s¸u¨mlerinin olmaması (o¨rn. kopy-
alanan/c¸alınan parmak izlerinin deg˘is¸tirilemiyor olması), iii) ırk, cinsiyet ve sag˘lık
durumu gibi hassas bilgileri ifs¸a edebiliyor olmaları. Hemen akla gelen o¨neri, biy-
ometrik verilerinin kis¸inin sahip oldug˘u aygıtlarda saklanması (o¨rn. akıllı kart),
problemi tam olarak c¸o¨zemez, c¸u¨nku¨ ko¨tu¨ niyetli kullanıcılar aygıtlarının bozuldug˘unu
veya c¸alındıg˘ını iddia edip biyometrik dog˘rulamayı tamamen devre dıs¸ı bırakabilirler.
Bahsi gec¸en endis¸eler ve sorunlar birles¸tig˘inde, kis¸isel gizlilig˘i sag˘layan biyometrik
dog˘rulama yo¨ntemlerine duyulan ihtiyac¸ o¨nemli o¨lc¸u¨de artmaktadır.
Tezimizin ana aras¸tırma katkılarını s¸u s¸ekilde o¨zetleyebiliriz: kis¸isel gizlilig˘i
sag˘layan biyometrik sistemlerinin irdelenmesi, o¨nemli birisinin gerc¸eklenmesi ve
analizi; c¸oklu biyometrik verileri birles¸tirerek kis¸isel gizlilig˘i sag˘layan yeni bir yo¨ntemin
o¨nerilmesi; dinamik imzaların var olan kis¸isel gizlilig˘i sag˘layan yo¨ntemler c¸erc¸evesinde
kullanılabilirlig˘ini saptamak amacıyla, ayırt edicilik kapasitelerinin aras¸tırılması.
O¨nerdig˘imiz c¸oklu biyometrik yo¨ntemi, birden c¸ok biyometrik veriyi birles¸tirerek
bu bilgilerin gizlilig˘ini sag˘lar. Ayrıca c¸oklu biyometrik s¸ablonlarının bulundug˘u
bir veritabanı, tek bir biyometrik (o¨rn. parmak izi) kullanılarak izinsiz sorgu-
lanamaz. Gizlilik unsurlarını sag˘lamasına ek olarak bu yo¨ntemin ayrıca kimlik
dog˘rulamada da tekli bir sisteme go¨re daha bas¸arılı oldug˘unu deneysel sonuc¸larımızla
kanıtlamaktayız. Tez kapsamında yo¨ntemimizin iki ayrı gerc¸eklemesini go¨stermekteyiz:
birinde aynı kis¸inin iki farklı parmak izini dig˘erinde ise parmak izini ve sesli s¸ifresini
birles¸tirebildig˘imizi ve kis¸i dog˘rulamada bas¸arıyla kullanılabildiklerini go¨stermekteyiz.
Bulanık Kasa adı verilen yo¨ntem, biyometrik bilgilerin gizlenmesinde kullanılabilecek
bir yo¨ntem olarak o¨n plana c¸ıkmıs¸tır, ancak deg˘is¸ik biyometrik verilerinin bulanık
kasa c¸erc¸evesinde nasıl kullanılacakları konusunda ac¸ıklık yoktur. Tezimiz kap-
samında, bulanık kasa yo¨ntemini parmak izi ve dinamik imzalar ile gerc¸ekledik,
ayrıca sır paylas¸ımında nasıl kullanılabileceg˘ini go¨sterdik. Kriptografide oldukc¸a
yaygın olan sır paylas¸ım yo¨ntemleri, gizli kalması gereken bilginin, sadece birkac¸
kis¸inin bir araya gelmesiyle ac¸ıg˘a c¸ıkması gereken durumlarda kullanılır. Bulanık
kasa yo¨ntemi ile gelis¸tirdig˘imiz sistemde, ancak belirlenen sayıda kis¸ilerin parmak
izlerinin bir araya gelmesi ile ac¸ıg˘a c¸ıkarılan sır, hem dog˘rulama hem de s¸ifreleme
amac¸lı kullanılabilmektedir. Son olarak da, tezimiz kapsamında bulanık kasa yo¨nteminin
ilinti saldırılarına kars¸ı dayanıksız kalacag˘ı iddiasını test ettik; bu kapsamda, o¨nerilen
saldırıları gerc¸ekleyip, deneysel olarak sıklıkla bas¸arılı olduklarını go¨sterdik.
Bir biyometrik verinin ayırt edicilik kapasitesi onun bireysellig˘ine dayanmak-
tadır ve verinin bu¨yu¨k o¨lc¸ekli ya da kriptografik uygulamalarda tercih edilmesinde
o¨nemli bir etkendir. Tezimiz kapsamında, dinamik imzaların dog˘rulama amac¸lı kul-
lanılabilirlig˘ini desteklemek amacıyla, ortalama bir imzanın sahip oldug˘u tahmin
edilme olasılıg˘ını modelledik. Bunun ic¸in imzaların Fourier katsayılarına dayanan
bir go¨sterim ve o¨zgu¨n es¸les¸tirme yo¨ntemi o¨nerdik ve bunları kullanarak iki imza
arasındaki rastlantısal es¸les¸me olasılıg˘ını hesapladık. O¨nerilen modele ve kestirilen
deg˘is¸kenlere dayanarak, dinamik imzaların oldukc¸a du¨s¸u¨k ( 10−4) bir tahmin edilme
olasılıg˘ı oldug˘u sonucuna varmaktayız.
Son olarak da tez kapsamında toplanan dinamik imzaları, kapsamlı test protokol-
leri ile birles¸tirerek aras¸tırma amac¸lı kullanıma ac¸tık.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With demanding security regulations throughout the world and increasing amount
of valuable services provided using the Internet and other networked media, the
assurance of secure and privacy preserving identity authentication became a crucial
issue. Assurance of both security and privacy is itself a very challenging task since
security requirements are prone to undermine a user’s privacy. While private in-
formation (eg. social security number, marital status, facial photo etc.) collected
during enrollment for a particular service increases security, unauthorized disclosure
of such information undermines the prerogative of privacy. Likewise, a person’s ac-
tions can be tracked by linking different sources of information and utilizing that
person’s uniquely identifying surrogates (eg. credit card and social security num-
bers, fingerprints, etc.). In this chapter, we elaborate on commonly utilized user
authentication methods; we overview general aspects of biometrics and discuss its
associated privacy concerns.
There are three major identity authentication approaches: knowledge-based,
token-based and biometrics [1]. Knowledge-based methods rely on information that
only a genuine user is supposed to know, such as passwords or PINs. Token-based
authentication requires that the user presents a legitimate token which is provided by
a recognized authority. Commonly used tokens are smart cards with built-in micro
chips which can store a user’s personal information, access rights, etc. Biometric
authentication requires that a subject possesses a body trait (such as a fingerprint or
iris pattern) or is able to reproduce a particular behavioral task (such as a signature
1
or spoken password) that matches the previously stored template, in order to be
positively verified.
Password and token-based authentication methods have noticeable shortcomings
which we shortly discuss. An ordinary person may have difficulties with remember-
ing a password which is complex enough to be guessed by someone else. As a result,
people commonly write down their passwords on unprotected media (eg. piece of
paper, back of a credit card, etc.) or use passwords associated with themselves [2]
(eg. birthdays, telephone numbers, names of the relatives, nicknames of pets, etc.)
which enable attackers perform brute force attacks based on social engineering. Fur-
thermore, in order to reduce number of passwords required to remember, people tend
to use the same password or a small set of passwords for different applications [3].
Hence if a password is revealed by compromising one of the applications, the at-
tacker gets an access to all other applications used by that user. Resetting a user‘s
password is not a cheap procedure either, as it may seem; according to a password
survey conducted on corporate employees, the cost for resetting a password is esti-
mated as 30-50$ dollars. On the other hand, token-based methods have their own
disadvantages as smart cards or other tokens can be broken, lost or stolen. Fi-
nally, passwords and tokens are not tightly coupled with their owner’s identity, thus
can not provide non-repudiation (not being able to deny involvement). Biometrics
emerged as the technology promising to alleviate these shortcomings. It provides
convenience such that there is no need to remember or carry anything, user simply
has it as a part of his/her body. Biometric traits can not be shared, copied, lost or
stolen thus provide non-repudiation.
A generic biometric authentication system consists of two main parts: enrollment
and verification. During the enrollment, a user is asked to submit his/her biometric
trait, which is captured and digitized by a biometric sensor. Discriminative feature
values are then extracted and stored in the form of a template in the system’s
database, along with the user’s identity. To authenticate him/herself, a subject
submits his/her biometric trait (query) which is then compared against the template
corresponding to the claimed identity. Depending on the dissimilarity between the
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Figure 1.1: Main blocks of biometrics based user enrollment (left), authentication (middle)
and identification (right).
query and the template, the system either rejects or accepts the user as forgery
or genuine, respectively. Figure 1.1 schematically depicts biometric enrollment and
authentication phases (leftmost and middle columns).
Biometric data can also be used for identification, which is the task of searching
the database for the most similar biometric trait(s), given a biometric trait with an
unknown identity. For example, when a police finds an unknown fingerprint in a
crime scene, they search their records in order to find if it corresponds to a person
in their database. Identification is a much more time consuming operation than
authentication, as it requires a large number of comparisons. Figure 1.1 (rightmost
column) schematically depicts the identification task.
In evaluating the performance of a biometric verification system, there are two
important factors: false rejection rate (FRR) of genuine traits and false acceptance
rate (FAR) of impostor traits. Since these two error rates are inversely related, a
commonly reported performance measure is the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve which shows how true accept rate (1-FRR) changes with FAR, for dif-
ferent acceptance thresholds. When only a single performance measure is required,
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Figure 1.2: A sample error trade-off curve.
for instance while comparing different systems, the equal error rate (EER) that de-
notes the point on the ROC curve where FAR equals FRR, is often reported. The
Figure 1.2 illustrates above mentioned concepts.
Proper biometric traits must be selected for a particular security application.
The biometric chosen to be used in a military application may be different than
the one used for access control for an apartment building. Biometric traits can be
classified according to different criteria, such as existence, permanence, uniqueness,
ease of measurement, difficulty of being copied or reproduced, acceptance by the
general public, and cost of deployment. Table 1.1 represents an informal catego-
rization of some of the widely used biometric traits, which is intended to give the
rough picture. As can be seen, there are tradeoffs between these criteria. Often, a
biometric which is unique and difficult to measure and forge (e.g. retina), is also
less acceptable by the public and has higher deployment costs.
The discriminative capability of a biometric is based on its uniqueness/entropy
across the population which can be measured as the probability of a coinciden-
tal match between the biometric data of two different subjects. For example, the
uniqueness of fingerprints determines the probability of correspondence between two
arbitrary selected fingerprints. Assessing the entropy of a biometric trait is not as
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Uniqueness Acceptance Hard To Forge Permanence
Retina High Low High High
Iris High Medium High High
Fingerprint High Medium Medium Medium
Face Medium High Medium Low
Hand Medium High Medium Medium
Signature Medium High Medium Medium
Voice Low High Low Low
Table 1.1: Relative categorization of biometric traits.
straightforward as it is with passwords (i.e. by calculating all available passwords),
since simply calculating the entropy of a biometric signal without regard to the
intra-class variations would result in an unrealistically optimistic entropy measure.
Instead, the entropy of a biometric trait is established either by a theoretical model
and/or by a large scale empirical assessment. A biometric trait can be classified
as strong or weak according to its uniqueness degree. For instance, iris, fingerprint
and retina are considered strong while voice and gait are not. We broadly discuss
on these matters in Chapter 5.
Strong biometrics can be used to identify the owners, which rises certain privacy
concerns. Although, privacy has broad aspects and its boundaries may differ from
society to society, in our study we consider privacy as the ability of individuals
to control the flow of information about themselves and reveal such information
selectively with or without passing the right to disclose it to third parties. The
major concerns associated with biometrics are about i) the use of biometrics to
track people, ii) non-revocability of certain biometric traits once compromised, and
iii) disclosure of sensitive information such as race, gender and health problems,
which may be revealed by some biometric traits.
Tracking of individuals can be performed by linking separate databases which
have records or transactions associated with biometric traits of a person and re-
vealing where and when the person has been, what he/she has purchased etc. The
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parallel can be made to credit cards that have unique identification numbers. Once
a person makes a purchase, a transaction is being recorded into his/her bank’s
database. Such transactions record where and when the purchase is made, along
with the amount and other essential information. So if the credit card transaction
database is shared with other institution(s) that has a link between the credit card
number and the identity information of its owner, then it is a straightforward to
track that person’s whereabouts, shopping attitudes etc.
Additionally, tracking can be performed without sharing any such database.
Most of the biometric traits can be easily acquired without notice and special in-
volvement of their owners. For instance, facial and iris images can be easily pho-
tographed using a digital camera posed apart enough not to be noticeable by a sub-
ject. Likewise, people generally leave their fingerprints on whatever they touch and
registering someone’s voice without being noticed is relatively easy. Once obtained
and registered, their owners can be tracked. Most importantly, once a biometric is
stolen, it is stolen forever, no revocation or replacement is generally possible, except
for some of the behavioral biometrics such as signature.
Another privacy concern issue is about the fact that certain biometric data may
reveal sensitive information such as race, gender and health problems [4]. For in-
stance, according to the study of McLean [5] the diseases causing fragility of palm
skin and nails can disclose certain genetic disorders. Chen [6] mentions that abnor-
malities of fingerprint ridges may be caused either by certain chromosomal disor-
ders, which are associated with Down, Turners and Klinefelters syndromes, or by
nonchromosomal disorders that may be due to leukemia, breast cancer and Rubella
syndromes. Similarly, Schuster [7] identified a correlation between the so-called
digital-arc fingerprint pattern and chronic intestinal pseudo-obstruction disease, con-
jectured to be caused by a genetic disorder. The retina and iris biometrics may reveal
diabetes, arteriosclerosis and hypertension as well as their own diseases [8]. Hence,
if a biometric is used to find out about such sensitive information which may be
later used to deny health insurance, employment or any such privilege, it is surely
a privacy breach. On the other hand, although biometric traits may reveal certain
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diseases, we don’t know whether biometric templates themselves (e.g. fingerprint
minutiae) can disclose any such sensitive information.
Yet another privacy concern is the function creep: initially, biometric traits may
be used solely for important authentication purposes, but their use may become
so common place in the future with potentially unforeseeable consequences. Social
Security Number (SSN) practiced in United States is a good example for such con-
cerns. SSN was initially used in record keeping of Social Security taxes. Later, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) started using the SSN for tax identification purposes
and currently SSN is required for employment, insurance, driving licence and many
more [4].
Some straightforward privacy preserving solutions can come to mind: i) instead
of using central databases, smart card like tokens can be used to store biometric
templates, ii) biometric templates can be stored in an encrypted form rather than
being stored as a plain feature vector. However, none of these solutions is actually
practical for preserving privacy. In particular, forgers can claim that their card is
broken or stolen and avoid biometric verification altogether. Besides, restoration
of broken or lost tokens may require referring to a central database for certain le-
gitimacy verification. Encrypting biometric templates will alleviate certain privacy
issues that arise with unintended sharing of the databases. In such situation, link-
ing databases without encryption keys will be infeasible. However, this requires
management of encryption keys, which has its own privacy concerns and additional
security challenges.
Tomko [9] proposed to use biometric traits only as encryption keys without stor-
ing biometric templates. In an example solution, a user’s fingerprint would be used
to encrypt a secret information required to access different applications/services.
Since the secret information is encrypted and the access to different applications is
supposed to be using different secret information, linking databases to track people
across applications will be infeasible. Although this is a good solution, there are
drawbacks associated with it. In particular, extracting a cryptographic key from a
noisy and variable data such as biometrics is a very challenging task and remains
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an open research area.
In this thesis, we review state-of-the art research on privacy protection in bio-
metric systems (Chapter 2) and propose our own privacy preserving framework with
its practical realizations using fingerprint and voice biometrics (Chapter 3). We
demonstrate how online signatures can be used for cryptographic key generation
and how biometric traits can be used for secret sharing (Chapter 4). Then, in order
to substantiate the use of online signatures in authentication and cryptographic key
generation, we present a theoretical model measuring the discriminative capability
of online signatures (Chapter 5). Finally, we present an online signature database
along with associated testing protocols, to be used in testing online signature veri-
fication systems (Chapter 6).
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Chapter 2
Previous Work
In this chapter, we review previously proposed methods which are applicable for
privacy protection in biometric authentication systems. We review biometric cryp-
tosystems which utilize both biometric traits and cryptographic protocols to achieve
higher security and user convenience (Section 2.1). For the sake of completeness,
we also review privacy enhancing methodologies that prevent using biometric iden-
tification in surveillance video records (Section 2.2).
2.1 Template Protection and Biometric Cryptosys-
tems
Biometric systems are gaining popularity as more trustable alternatives to password-
based security systems, since there are no passwords to remember and biometrics
cannot be stolen and are difficult to copy. Biometrics also provide non-repudiation
(an authenticated user cannot deny having done so) because of the difficulty in
copying or stealing one’s biometrics. On the other hand, biometric measurements
are also known to be variable and noisy; the same biometric trait of a person may
slightly vary between consecutive acquisitions due to the noise in the acquisition
process, surrounding environment, injury, or even a bad mood. For example, differ-
ent impressions of a fingerprint can greatly vary due to differences in the dryness
of the finger tip, the levels and location of pressure applied to the finger tip, or
different sensors, as demonstrated in the Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Different impressions of the same fingerprint, demonstrating distortion and
noise introduced during the acquisition process.
Biometric template refers to the information extracted from a biometric and
stored as the reference. For instance, if a fingerprint is used, the biometric template
may consists of features extracted from the fingerprint image (e.g. minutiae points
indicating the branching and ending points of the ridges of the fingerprint). Biomet-
ric template protection, in turn, generally refers to protecting one’s biometric data
or biometric template from unauthorized access or unintended use (e.g. to track
the person or to gather sensitive information about the person). As mentioned in
the previous chapter, biometric template protection is especially important because
biometrics cannot be revoked and re-issued once compromised.
Uludag et al. makes the distinction between two general approaches within what
they call crypto-biometric systems, according to the coupling level of cryptography
and biometrics [10]: Biometrics-based key release refers to the use of biometric
authentication to release a previously stored cryptographic key. Biometric authen-
tication is used as a wrapper, adding convenience to traditional cryptography where
the user would have been in charge of remembering his/her key; however the two
techniques are only loosely coupled. Biometrics-based key generation refers to ex-
tracting/generating a cryptographic key from a biometric template or construct. In
this case, biometrics and cryptography are tightly coupled: the secret key is bound
to the biometric information and the biometric template is not stored in plain form.
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In its most basic sense, generating a cryptographic key from a biometric template
(say fingerprints) has not been very successful, as it involves obtaining an exact key
from a highly variable data.
Soutar et al. [11] proposed a method to bind cryptographic keys with the image
of the fingerprint. The key is released only upon the presentation of the genuine
fingerprint’s image and can be used for user authentication and additionally for
cryptographic encryption/decryption operations. If a key is somehow compromised
a new one can be generated and re-associated with the fingerprint image by re-
enrolling a user. The algorithm is based on the correlation filter function which is
calculated from reference fingerprint images. The filter function, when applied onto
the genuine fingerprint image, is supposed to produce consistent output pattern.
The method also make use of error correction codes to account for small variations
in the filter output. Main drawbacks of the Soutar et al.’s work are: i) the formal
and systematic cryptographic security analysis of the method is not provided [12,13]
and ii) method requires aligned fingerprints (reference and query fingerprint images
must be aligned precisely) which brings user inconvenience i.e. each time users must
place their fingerprints on a sensor almost the same way.
Teoh et al. proposed to map a biometric feature vector onto a randomly gener-
ated orthonormal vector space in order to obtain a revocable binary representation
of a biometric, which is then used for authentication [14, 15]. We shortly describe
here an implementation using fingerprints [14] while the other implementation us-
ing face biometric [15] is very similar. In order to extract fingerprint feature vector,
an integrated Wavelet and Fourier-Mellin transform [16] is applied to a fingerprint
image. Then, a number of orthonormal vector spaces are generated by applying
Gram-Schmidt transform to a randomly generated matrices. The generation of ran-
dom matrices is controlled by a seed used to initialize a random number generator.
That seed is then stored to a user’s token (eg. smart card). A number of gener-
ated matrices corresponds to the number of bits desired to represent the fingerprint
(best results are reported for 60 and 80 bits). Inner products between the feature
vector and each of the orthonormal vector spaces are calculated. The results of
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inner products are binarized and concatenated into a bit string which is stored in
the system database. During verification, user’s bit string is similarly calculated
using the query fingerprint and the seed stored on his/her token. The user is suc-
cessfully authenticated if the Hamming distance between the calculated bit string
and that stored on the system’s database is small. Authors report 0% ERR using
fingerprint representation of 40 and more bits. One of the drawbacks is that the
method requires robust detection of fingerprint’s core point around which the image
is cropped. The other drawback is the requirement of secure storage media such as
smart card for a random number generator’s seed, which reduces convenience of the
proposed method.
Davida et al. [17, 18] and Hao et al. [19] proposed the use the IrisCode, a 2048
bit string extracted from iris texture proposed by Daugman [20], to generate cryp-
tographic keys. We review only the work of Hao et al. as it provides more prac-
tical implementation and contains less restrictive assumptions compared to that of
Davida et al. Daugman has shown that genuine IrisCode’s may have up to 30%
bit difference due to noise and image processing artifacts [20], thus they can not be
directly applied for encryption. In order to obtain a reliable iris representation, Hao
et al. analyzed the reasons behind the differences and devised a 2-stage error cor-
rection algorithm which is based on Hadamard and Reed-Solomon error correction
codes [21,22]. The key is bind to and retrieved from the IrisCode using some helper
data which must be stored on a secured media (authors assume that it is stored
on the smart card). Possession of both a genuine iris image and the helper data is
required in order to successfully release the associated key. The key can be revoked
by changing the helper data. Authors report that they could generate 140-bit keys
at 0.47% FRR and 0% FAR. Main drawback of the scheme is that it requires secured
media to store helper data which reduces convenience of the method.
Monrose et al. [23] propose a method to enhance security of a conventional
password based authentication system using keystroke behaviors of its users. The
security of the method is based on the difficulty of the polynomial reconstruction
problem. For each user a m × 2 (row x column) table containing evaluation pairs
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(i.e. [x,P(x)]) of a m − 1 degree polynomial (P) is created. Initially, each cell con-
tains valid evaluation pair (i.e. one ling on the polynomial), but as the user logs
into the system, his/her consistent keystroke features are being estimated and cells,
identified according to these features, are being perturbed such that corresponding
evaluation pair is no more ling on the polynomial. When a user logs into the system,
his/her keystroke features are being calculated and the evaluation pairs correspond-
ing to these features are used to reconstruct the polynomial. If the polynomial is
correctly reconstructed, the user is successfully authenticated. It is assumed that
even if the attacker will intercept the password, he/she will not be able to reproduce
keystroke dynamics of the genuine user, thus will fail to correctly identify the valid
evaluation pairs and reconstruct the polynomial. Authors were able to increase the
security/entropy of passwords by approximately 15 bits, which is indeed not very
substantial. Additionally, Monrose et al. demonstrate extension of their method
to the voice biometric, where they succeed in obtaining a 60-bit cryptographic keys
from the uttered pass phrases [24, 25]. However, even a 60-bit cryptographic keys
are considered week for the most of the contemporary cryptographic applications.
Recent work of Juels et al. [13] is also classified as biometrics-based key gen-
eration, allowing for a tight coupling of cryptography and biometrics. Juels and
Wattenberg proposed the fuzzy commitment scheme [26]; later Juels and Sudan
extended it to the fuzzy vault scheme [13] and described how it can be used to con-
struct/release an encryption key using one’s biometrics: a secret (cryptographic key)
is locked using a biometric data of a person, such that someone who possesses a sub-
stantial amount of the locking elements (e.g. another reading of the same biometric)
would be able to decrypt the secret [13]. The fuzzy vault scheme is classified as a
key-generation scheme in Uludag et al., because of its tight coupling of cryptography
and biometrics [10]. However, in the sense that the biometric data releases a pre-
viously stored key, it can also be seen as a releasing mechanism. Clancy et al. [27],
Yang and Verbauwhede [28] and Uludag et al. [29] implemented the fuzzy vault using
fingerprints, making simplifying assumptions about the biometric data. We describe
details of the fuzzy vault scheme as well as provide our own implementations using
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fingerprints and online signatures in the Chapter 4.
Feng and Wah proposed a private key generation method using online signatures
[30]. The method is based on feature quantization and used only dynamic features
of a signature. First, the range of each feature is calculated across all subjects to
obtain database boundaries for that feature. During enrollment, user boundaries
are found similarly and the database range for each feature is divided into bins of
size equal to the user’s range. Then, the indices of the bins where the user’s features
are mapped, are concatenated into a single vector from which the cryptographic
hash value is calculated. In other words, quantization is done adaptively for each
user. The hash value is then used to calculate a private key for that user. Authors
report a performance of 8% equal error rate in generating the keys. They also
analyze the entropy of each feature and conclude that online signatures contain on
average 40 bits of entropy, calculated as the sum of individual feature entropies.
Since the features may not be independent, this estimate of the signature entropy
is an overestimate.
Ratha et al. suggest [31] and implements [32] a framework of cancelable biomet-
rics, where a biometric data undergoes a predefined non-invertible distortion during
both enrollment and verification phases; if the transformed biometric is compro-
mised, the user is re-enrolled to the system using a new transformation. Likewise,
different applications are also expected to use different transformations for the same
user. Although this framework hides original (undistorted) biometric and enables
revocation of a (transformed) biometric, it introduces the management of transform
databases, and still requires registration of reference points.
Tuyls et al. demonstrated a practical application of their previously proposed
privacy protecting theoretical scheme [33,34] to the ear canal biometric [35]. A fixed
length feature vector is extracted from a headphone to ear canal transfer function
[36], which is then used to encode a secret key. After selecting an appropriate
encoding function, each dimension of the feature space is quantized into a fixed
number of bins. During encoding, a helper data is generated, which contains offsets
used in mapping the test biometric’s feature values to their corresponding bins.
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The helper data and a cryptographic hash value of the secret key are stored in the
systems database.
During authentication, the query biometric’s feature values are summed with
the corresponding helper data offsets, and the resulting values are mapped on to
the bins. Depending on whether a feature value is mapped to an even (0) or odd
(1) indexed bin, its corresponding bit value is generated. Finally, a hash value of
the generated bit string is compared to that stored in the system’s database. It is
assumed that a few bit errors can be fixed, prior to calculation of the hash value,
using an appropriate error correction code. In their theoretical work, authors provide
systematic proofs that the proposed method doesn’t leak information sufficient to
guess the key or reveal the biometric template. On the other hand, the proposed
method requires that the template and query biometric data are precisely aligned as
well as the intra-class variation and the noise introduced during the data acquisition
can be handled by proper feature space quantization. Another drawback is that the
maximum bit size of the secret key is limited by the number of extracted biometric
features.
2.2 Privacy Protection in Surveillance Video
Privacy preserving in surveillance video is also a very important and widely concern-
ing issue, as people can be identified and tracked across different video recordings
using biometric identification technology such as face or gait recognition.
Governments and private sector are spending considerable portions of their bud-
gets for surveillance. For instance, according to Tyler [37] Britain has approximately
4.2 million of Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) cameras installed. It is estimated that
an ordinary British citizen might be captured by more than 300 separate cameras
on an average day [37]. In such circumstances, if recordings of these cameras were
accessible to unintended authorities, then revealing where and for how long the per-
son has been, whom s/he has met, what s/he has bought or where s/he has ate can
be accomplished by identifying faces, gaits or voices of recorded people, if the video
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quality allowed such identification.
Last but not least, video recordings are kept for a long time and can be redis-
tributed very quickly and to a large audience. For example, a video clip, containing
private life events of a person, can be relatively easy broadcast using the Internet,
which indeed occurs frequently. Even if the clip is removed from the web site shortly
after, it is impossible to destroy all of the copies already downloaded by its viewers.
Thus the clip can appear at a later time and continue to reveal someone’s private
life forever.
Privacy issues associated with video surveillance are being raised by many in-
stitutions and individuals [4, 38–40]. However, engineering solutions that preserve
privacy must be also developed. Privacy protection in surveillance video is rather
new and emerging research area. In this section, we review a few of the available
approaches aiming for privacy protection in surveillance video.
Masking the eyes or the complete face of an individual with a black bar and
changing his/her voice during various TV programs (e.g. secret agent talking about
successful operation) can be considered as initial attempts to preserve privacy in
video records. However, while preserving privacy of people recorded on the video,
such methods are of limited interest since these can not be used as evidence for
prosecution. It is worth to mention that saving two copies of a video (i.e. one with all
private regions masked and the original copy encrypted) does not solve the problem,
as it requires additional investments for storage and enhancements/enforcements to
maintain the overall security and integrity of the entire system.
A similar approach is proposed by Newton et al. [41], where authors argue that
masking faces is of limited interest for various multimedia applications. Instead,
they propose to de-identify (i.e. degrade) facial features such that face recogni-
tion software will be unable to correctly identify degraded faces. While preserving
privacy, this approach has similar drawbacks with the aforementioned method.
Sony Inc. proposed and patented a method to detect skin regions and replace
them with arbitrary colors, which to some extent prevents determination of the
race [42]. It is clear that such precaution is also of limited interest for privacy
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protection as face identification is still possible. Likewise, racial origin can still be
estimated based on other facial features (eg. structure of the eyes, skulls or lips).
Senior et al. proposed a privacy preserving video console [43], which is rather
a framework for managing video content of the surveillance video using computer
vision techniques and cryptography. The system records the video in an encrypted
form and re-renders demanded video portion or provides just a particular event
according to the user’s privileges. Implementation of this system and/or applying
it to existing systems are the main challenges.
Boult [44] proposed to obscure the private content of an image/video using in-
vertible cryptographic transform. The region containing the private information is
cropped from the image or the video frame just after a lossy encoding operation (eg.
DCT, DWT). Then, that region is encrypted using any arbitrary encryption tech-
nique (eg. DES, AES), and mapped back to the image for final encoding. Since the
encryption transforms the given data to a complete random stream, the cropped re-
gion is completely obscured, which enhances privacy. Figure 2.2 demonstrates such
masking. Only authorities possessing encryption key (presumably law enforcement
authorities) can decrypt the obscured regions and reveal the identities of the corre-
sponding individuals. Boult implemented this technique to only JPEG images, and
claims that the compression overhead introduced by his approach will not exceed
10% if implemented for MPEG video.
Dufaux and Ebrahimi proposed a region-based transform-domain scrambling
technique [45, 46]. Firstly, regions of private information (eg. faces or complete
body) are detected on a video frame by means of computer vision techniques. These
regions are then scrambled (i.e. obscured) by flipping signs of the corresponding cod-
ing transform coefficients (eg. DCT or DWT) during the encoding. The flipping is
controlled by a secret key and is invertible, meaning that someone who possesses the
key can reconstruct the original images/frames. Additionally, regions of arbitrary
shapes can be scrambled and the degree of the obscuration is adjustable through
the number of flipped coefficients.
To enhance privacy, Zhang et al. [47] proposed a method to replace sensitive
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Figure 2.2: Image regions containing faces are cropped, then encrypted and mapped back
to their original places for privacy protection.
regions of a video record with their corresponding backgrounds and store removed
regions as a watermark in the corresponding video. When required, authorities
possessing the encryption key can reveal the watermark and reconstruct the original
video footage. Additionally, a digital signature is embedded into the video header
to detect any tampering. The main drawback of the proposed method is that it
highly increases the frame rate.
Providing quantitative measure for the privacy enhancement is another research
area. Jonathon Phillips [48] studied the inverse relation between privacy and surveil-
lance performance. He proposed a privacy operating characteristic curve (POC),
which is an analogy of receiver operating curve (ROC), which is commonly used to
assess false accept rate versus false reject rate of a biometric verification system.
Using POC, system administrators can select an appropriate operating point for
a surveillance system with regard to a privacy enhancing level. The POC curve
is obtained by degrading sensitive information content in a corresponding video
record, which corresponds to a certain privacy level, and measuring its correspond-
ing surveillance performance at that level.
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Chapter 3
Multi-Biometric Templates for Privacy Protection
We propose a biometric authentication framework which is based on the idea of
using multiple biometric traits to increase both privacy and security of the verifi-
cation system. Specifically, we combine different biometric traits of an individual
to create a multi-biometric template. Due to the difficulty of separating the multi-
biometric template into its constituents, the individual biometrics are protected.
Also, if one uses separate sets of biometrics for different security applications, the
resulting multi-biometric templates are different, preventing tracking by linking sev-
eral databases. Security is also increased since verification requires each component
biometrics. As a particular example, we demonstrate a fingerprint verification sys-
tem that uses two separate fingerprints of the same individual. A multi-biometric
template is created by overlaying the minutiae points of two fingerprints and then
storing the combination in the central database.
3.1 Overview of Fingerprint Verification
Fingerprints have a long history of being used for person identification. Although
different fingerprint representations are available, the minutiae point representation
is by far the most prevailing and popular [49]. Minutiae points of a fingerprint are
the landmark points formed by the ridge structure of the corresponding fingerprint.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates different minutia point types on a sample fingerprint image.
Relative ridge structure of fingerprints and their minutiae points are established
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before birth and are accepted to be unique to each individual. Even identical twins
have different fingerprints, due to the fact that the formation of each fingerprint is
dependent not only on the individual’s DNA, but is also highly effected by the micro-
environment (pressure and temperature differences, flow of fluids, etc.) surrounding
the fingerprint tip [50].
Figure 3.1: Most commonly used fingerprint minutiae points: delta, core, ridge ending
and ridge bifurcation.
There are several methods proposed in the literature for automatic minutiae ex-
traction [51,52]. Majority of such methods extract minutiae from a skeletonized (all
ridge lines are reduced to 1-pixel thickness) fingerprint ridge pattern. Prior to detec-
tion, the fingerprint image is adaptively enhanced, making use of the overall ridge
flow, then binarized and finally thinned. Figure 3.2 illustrates minutiae extraction
process. The detection may result in spurious or missing minutiae, which is due
to the skin cuts and imperfections or noise introduced during the fingerprint image
acquisition. In order to purify the detected minutiae, a post-processing is generally
performed [53,54].
Two fingerprints are accepted as similar if there is a sufficient number of match-
ing minutiae. The acceptance threshold differs from country to country; for instance,
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the commonly implemented minutiae extraction method.
USA’s F.B.I. require 12, British Scotland Yard 16 and Interpol 12 minutiae point
correspondence [55]. Jain et al. proposed an automatic fingerprint matching al-
gorithm where the ridge information is used to align the corresponding minutiae
sets and small displacements between matching minutiae are handled by accepting
a match if it is within a bounding box [49, 56]. Ratha et al. proposed a matching
technique based on graph representation, which is constructed for both the query
and template fingerprints [57]. The state-of-the-art performance of automatic finger-
print verification algorithms varies between 0.01-2.15% depending on the difficulty
of the database used for testing. The above mentioned performance results are re-
ported by internationally accepted fingerprint verification competitions [58–61] and
the fingerprint vendor technology evaluations [62].
Multiple biometric modalities are used to increase the security of the system or to
address cases where a user may not posses a required biometric (eg. due to injury).
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For example, a user may be asked to put his fingerprint and pronounce a codeword in
order to be positively authenticated. The combination/fusion of different biometric
data can occur at various levels, namely decision, score or feature levels. For feature
level fusion, features extracted from different biometric traits can be combined for a
single classifier. In the case of decision level fusion, separate classifiers can operate
independently on different biometric traits and their matching scores are combined
for the final decision [49,63,64]. Several different systems are proposed for combining
multiple biometrics; for instance voice and face biometrics [65–67] and fingerprint
and face biometrics [68].
3.2 Multi-Biometric Authentication Framework
In this section, we formalize and demonstrate our framework using fingerprints. We
also explain how the proposed framework can be extended using the voice biometric.
3.2.1 Feature Extraction
We used ridge ending and ridge bifurcation minutiae points as our features, since
these are the most commonly utilized fingerprint features. We only use minutiae
point locations, discarding the additional information associated with the minu-
tiae points (eg. ridge orientation, grayscale neighborhood) as it may leak sensitive
information.
Since the aim of this work is to conceptually demonstrate the framework, we
used manually labeled minutiae locations, to avoid errors that may be caused by
an imperfect minutiae extraction module. Hence the features extracted from one
fingerprint image is a set of minutiae locations (x,y).
3.2.2 Multi-Biometric Template Generation
In order to create a multi-biometric template, a user submits the impressions of
his/her two different fingerprints, hereafter denoted by A and B. Minutiae point
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locations of these two fingerprints are detected and then scrambled with each other
to hide their source. Here we introduce a scrambling operator (denoted by ∪), which
offsets one minutiae set with respect to the other set, roughly aligning their centers of
gravity. This combined minutiae set (A∪B), which constitutes the multi-biometric
template, is then stored in the system database.
Figure 3.3: Two fingerprints A (on the left) and B (in the middle) are combined to form
the multi-biometric template (A∪B on the right). Minutiae points are differently marked
for the sake of clarity.
The template creation process is illustrated in the Figure 3.3, where the combined
minutiae set is shown on the right. Note that in this multi-fingerprint template,
minutiae origins (i.e. their corresponding fingerprints) are illustrated with separate
markers solely for the clarity of the illustration; in reality, they are indistinguishable
in the multi-biometric template.
Note that the template can be generated by many different fingerprint pairs; as
such, it is not a unique identifier of the person. Likewise, two different persons can
engage in creating a shared multi-biometric template. For instance, such shared
templates can be created for an application requiring presence of two authorizing
people in order to approve or initiate a particular task.
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3.2.3 Matching
When a person is to be authenticated, he/she again submits new impressions of
his/her two fingerprints (hereafter denoted by A′ and B′), both of which are used to
verify his/her identity. The verification consists of two sequential steps: in each step
a single query fingerprint is matched against the template of the claimed identity.
In the first step, A′ is matched against the multi-biometric template and all
matching points are discarded from the template, resulting in A ∪ B − A′. We
introduced a fuzzy set subtraction operator (indicated by −) that allows for some
tolerance in matching. Then, the second fingerprint B′ is matched against the re-
maining minutiae points in the template. In both of the cases, the matching is
done by finding the correspondence between the minutiae points of a query fin-
gerprint and the multi-biometric template. Both the minutiae extraction and the
point correspondence algorithm are non-essential to the proposed method and any
previously developed minutiae detection or correspondence algorithms can be used.
The matching process for a case where both of the query fingerprints are genuine, is
illustrated in the Figure 3.4. Note that even though the minutiae points are marked
in the figures with circles and square, indicating their corresponding source fingers,
that is done solely for the clarity and the sake of explanation. As we previously
mentioned, origins of minutiae points are not kept in the template.
Finally, we calculate a matching score using the Jaccard index between the two
sets involved in the last matching; in other words, the percentage of matching points
in B′ and the remainder set:
Jaccard(A ∪B − A′, B′) = 2×
∣∣(A ∪B − A′) ∩B′∣∣∣∣(A ∪B − A′) ∪B′∣∣ (3.1)
Here we introduce a fuzzy set intersection operator (indicated by ∩) which tolerates
for some misalignment between corresponding minutiae points; and |X| indicates
the cardinality of the set X. The person is authenticated if the match score is above
a threshold, which is selected in this case as the point that corresponds to the equal
error rate.
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Figure 3.4: An illustration of matching two genuine fingerprints (A′ and B′) against the
multi-biometric template.
Note that even though the overall match score seems to be based solely on B′’s
match, if A′ was not successfully matched, it would be reflected in the final score
since many minutiae points would be left unmatched, making the denominator large.
There is still a bit of asymmetry since unmatched points of A′ are not factored in
the matching score. This could be remedied by reversing the order of the match
sequence (first B′ and then A′) and averaging the two resulting scores.
We consider three different cases in order to show how the proposed scheme
works. In the first case, both of the query biometrics are genuine: A′ will match
A∪B, leaving mostly points of B and the rest is equivalent to the verification with
a single biometric. In case A′ matches A perfectly and B′ matches B perfectly, the
resulting score is 1. The second case assumes that A′ is forgery while B′ is genuine:
A′ will still have a good match to A∪B which has a large number of points (roughly
twice as many than A′). But then, even though B′ is a genuine biometric, it will not
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Figure 3.5: An illustration of matching a forgery (A′) and a genuine (B′) fingerprint
against the multi-biometric template.
have a good match with (A∪B−A′). Figure 3.5 shows a sample for this case. The
third case is where A′ is genuine and B′ is forgery: A′ will have a good match to
(A∪B) leaving mostly the B component, so the rest is equivalent to the verification
of a single forgery biometric, which will not result in a good match.
The number of matching minutiae obtained in the first step is significantly higher
than if two corresponding fingerprints (A and A′) were matched, due to the large
number of minutiae points in the multi-biometric template (about twice as many
minutiae points as a single fingerprint). In particular, fingerprints with few minutiae
points match to several multi-biometric templates with large sets of minutiae points.
However, this does not reduce the effectiveness of the system: if any minutiae from
B are matched by A′, it will reduce the match score only if it matters (if A’s and
B’s minutiae are nearby, it does not matter whose minutiae are matched). On
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the other hand, this property makes it very difficult to search the multi-biometric
database using only a single fingerprint to find matching records. Note that this is
the intended result, since it prevents unauthorized uses of the database, for instance
performing identification with single fingerprints from another database or from a
crime scene. Hence, not only that the individual fingerprints are hidden (by way of
having two sets of points scrambled together), but also searching a multi-biometric
database is impractical, as explained in the experimental results section.
3.2.4 Experiments
A total of four fingerprint impressions (two from one finger and two from another
finger) are collected from each of the 100 people contributing to the database. One
impression from each finger (A and B) is added to the reference set: they are used to
form the multi-biometric for the person. The remaining two fingerprint impressions
(A′ and B′) are added to the test set: they are used to authenticate the person.
Figure 3.6 shows a quadruple from the database: the top row is the reference set
and the bottom row is the test set. Notice that the fingerprints have some missed
minutiae, due to the shifts and deformations introduced during the acquisition of
the imprints.
Once the data is collected, a multi-biometric template is constructed from the
reference set of each person in the database. For testing, we used the test set of
a person and did the sequential matching. Both of these steps are detailed in the
previous section. The minutiae points are marked manually, but the matching is
done automatically. Notice that the manual labeling of the minutiae points is not
essential: any reasonably successful minutiae detection and matching algorithm can
be applied. The automatic matching is done via an exhaustive matching algorithm
that aligns two point sets by finding the best alignment over all translations and
rotations, allowing for some elastic deformation of the fingerprint (accepting two
points as matching if they are within a small threshold in this alignment). Since
the aim of this work is to introduce the idea of a multi-biometric templates, we only
focused on showing that the resulting multi-biometric preserves privacy, while still
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Figure 3.6: Sample quadruple fingerprints from the database. Top row shows fingerprints
A and B; bottom row shows fingerprints A′ and B′, left to right.
successfully authenticating a person. Hence, minutiae detection and matching were
assumed to be given or were simply implemented.
Using our database and the proposed method explained in the Section 3.2, we
obtained a 2% false reject rate (FRR). In other words, 2 out of 100 people in the
database were not authorized using their second set of fingerprints (A′ and B′).
On the other hand, when each of these fingerprint pairs were used as a forgery for
all other people (for a total of 9900=100*99 data points), only 1.8% were falsely
accepted (FAR). The equal error rate (EER) was approximately at 1.9%. Most
of the errors were due to fingerprints that had significant stretching between two
imprints, as these are not well matched using our simple matching algorithm. Our
other biggest source of error is due to fingerprints that have missing left or right
parts (i.e. fingerprint occlusions), due to pressure being applied to one side of the
finger while taking the imprint.
In order to test how much error is introduced with the new authentication scheme
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(using two fingerprints instead of one), we calculated the error rates for a biometric
system that matched single fingerprints (e.g. A versus A′) using the same minutiae
detection and matching algorithms. The matching score used was the ratio of the
number of matching points over the total number of points in the matched and the
reference fingerprints:
Jaccard(A,A′) = 2×
∣∣A ∩ A′∣∣∣∣A ∪ A′∣∣ (3.2)
In this task, the FRR was found to be 3%: in other words, 6 fingerprints were
falsely rejected out of 200 fingerprints (100x2). When each fingerprint was used as
forgery for all the others, the FAR was found to be 2%. Hence, the multi-biometric
scheme not only did not introduce any additional errors, but rather reduced the
error rate. This is in fact as expected and observed in other multi-modal biometric
systems, since we are given more identifying information about the person. The
acceptance thresholds for both of the previous tests were set on the test set, for both
tasks, in order to give the EER. Since FAR and FRR are inversely proportional, this
is a common practice and does not introduce undue advantage.
Finally, we performed a privacy analysis in order to assess the degree of privacy
the multi-biometric template framework provides. We assessed whether a single
fingerprint was sufficient to search the multi-biometric template database (i.e. given
only one fingerprint, what are the chances to correctly identify a person?). The
scoring method used was based on the proportion of the minutiae points of the
presented fingerprint (A′) that matched the template set (A ∪B):
Jaccard((A ∪B), A′) = 2×
∣∣(A ∪B) ∩ A′∣∣∣∣(A ∪B) ∪ A′∣∣ (3.3)
Using this score, the fingerprint to be identified matched with the corresponding
multi-biometric template (i.e. the template gave the highest match score) for only
24% of the test cases. When considering top-5 results (accepting the person as
correctly identified if the correct template was in the top-5 highest matching al-
ternatives), the identification rate rose up to 39%. While 39% may seem a large
number, in a larger database, these numbers would be expected to be lower, making
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it infeasible to search the database using single fingerprints.
Figure 3.7: An illustration of a multi-biometric database search algorithm using different
fingerprint impression combinations.
People easily leave impressions of their fingerprints on surfaces and objects they
touch. Given that fact, the natural question would be whether an attacker can search
a multi-biometric template database with combinations of fingerprints obtained from
latent fingerprints? Figure 3.7 demonstrates a pseudocode illustration of such an
attack. Generally hundreds of fingerprint impressions are left on the surfaces or
objects and their quality is often much worse than regular impressions. Thus, such
attacks are infeasible, as a very large number of combinations are needed.
Yet another privacy related question is: Can two multi-biometric template databases
be linked together? An attacker may intercept different template databases and try
cross-matching their templates. Figure 3.8 illustrates such attack. It will be infea-
sible if users were to provide different fingerprints pairs for different applications.
Also, as we explain in the Section 3.3, this is a natural result when our framework
is used with fingerprint and voice modalities.
On the other hand, we have not fully proven that the combined biometric cannot
be used to track a person: it may be possible that a certain pattern of minutiae
distribution appears only for a given person. However, the addition of minutiae
points from the second fingerprint hides these patterns to the largest extent. For
future work, one can further look into how to best combine two biometrics (e.g. to
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Figure 3.8: An illustration of an algorithm used to cross match and identify corresponding
users in two different multi-biometric template databases.
Figure 3.9: Multi-biometric templates created for 3 different people, using 2 of their
fingerprints.
disperse the minutiae points as much as possible etc.) so as to hide the most unique
features of a fingerprint. Three separate combined fingerprint minutiae are shown in
the Figure 3.9 to give some idea of the scrambling that results from the combination
of two fingerprints.
3.3 Framework Realization Using Behavioral Traits
One of the substantial drawback with physiological biometric traits is that if they
are compromised, their revocation is impossible. On the other hand, changing of a
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behavioral trait, such as signature or a vocal password (or pass-phrase), is a relatively
easy task; one just needs to make up a new signature or choose another pass-phrase.
Additionally, an individual has a freedom of changing and using different instances
of his/her behavioral traits for different application (eg. different pass-phrases for
different applications), which is not as easy with physiological traits.
In this section, we overview the work of Camlikaya et. al [69] that shows a
realization of the multi-biometric template framework, for completeness. In this
implementation, fingerprint and voice biometrics are used in the creation of the
multi-biometric template, in order to benefit from the aforementioned characteris-
tics. The main challenge in this implementation is the extraction of suitable vocal
feature points that can be mapped to the 2D-plane of the minutiae points.
3.3.1 Feature Extraction and Template Generation
The Figure 3.10 demonstrates a typical voice signal. Short spectra of speech signals
convey distinguishing information about both the spoken words and the the vocal
characteristics of the speaker. Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC’s), which
convey both vocal characteristic of a person and uttered pass-phrase, are commonly
extracted from voice signal and are further used as feature values. The extraction
process of MFCC’s is inspired by the human hearing system [70].
Twelve MFCC features are extracted for each phoneme in a user uttered pass-
phrase. Then, feature values are binarized according to a threshold decided sepa-
rately for men and women, and grouped into a 16-bit chunks, each representing one
vocal feature point (8 bits for x and 8 bits for y coordinates). There were on aver-
age 25 phonemes in each pass-phrase collected for our voice database. This implies
that on average 19 vocal feature points (25× 12÷ 16) are calculated from the voice
biometric of a user. The feature extraction is described in detail in Camlikaya et
al. [69]. For fingerprints, minutiae points are extracted as described in Section 3.2.1.
In order to be enrolled to the system, the user provides his/her fingerprint and
utters a pass-phrase. Extracted fingerprint and vocal minutiae points are merged
using our set offset operator(∪) to form a multi-biometric template. The process of
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Figure 3.10: A typical digitized voice signal.
the template generation is demonstrated in Figure 3.11.
3.3.2 Matching
During authentication, a subject claims a particular identity (A ∪ B) and provides
his/her fingerprint (A′) along with a pass-phrase utterance (B′). The matching of
the query fingerprint and utterance are performed in a similar fashion with that of
the previous realization of the framework, described in the Section 3.2.3. First, the
fingerprint minutiae are matched against the template and then matching points are
discarded. Then, the vocal points are matched against remaining template points
((A ∪ B) − A′). The major difference from the previous matching strategy is that
the vocal points are matched to the remaining template points using the Hamming
distance, such that the perturbation of each bit has an equal weight. Hence, the
coordinates of the remaining template points (i.e. x and y) are concatenated, to
reconstruct the corresponding MFCC features and match the vocal points. Decision
regarding the authenticity of the user is made based on our previously formulated
matching score (the equation 3.1 defined in Section 3.2.3).
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Figure 3.11: A multi-biometric template creation using fingerprint and voice minutiae
points.
3.3.3 Experiments
Managing the collection of a multi-modal database is a costly procedure in regards
to time and budget; hence, previously collected fingerprint and voice databases
were paired to obtain a pseudo-multi-modal database. The fingerprint database
is described in the Section 3.2.4. Each of 100 subjects in that database provided
2 impressions of his/her 2 different fingers (400 impressions in total). The voice
database consists of 30 other subjects who provided 10 utterances of their pass-
phrases as well as attempted to forge someone else’s pass-phrase 10 times. Each
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pass-phrase is 6-digits long. Voice and fingerprint data were randomly paired as
if they belonged to the same person. In this configuration, there are 30 genuine
subjects enrolled to the system, where each subject has 2 impressions of his/her
fingerprint and 10 utterances of a pass-phrase. All other available fingerprints, as
well as 10 forgery utterances are used in forgery attempts for a user’s template.
The framework realization is tested using 3 different forgery scenarios: i) at-
tacker uses his/her fingerprint and voice, ii) attacker uses his/her fingerprint and
recorded voice of the user, iii) attacker uses collected fingerprint impression of the
user and his/her voice to utter user’s pass-phrase. The first one is the most com-
mon attack scenario where the forger is unable to get genuine biometric traits of the
claimed user and uses his/her own or someone else’s traits, instead. We achieved
0.77% EER when considering forgeries of this type. A unimodal voice verification
method of Camlikaya et al. achieved 3.3% EER [71], using the same feature extrac-
tion algorithm and test dataset, which indicates that the multi-biometric template
scheme significantly improved results of the unimodal system. For the second and
third scenarios, we achieved 5.50% and 21.30% EER. Last results indicate that the
fingerprint is relatively more important than voice in the context of this implemen-
tation, which is probably due to the relatively simple mapping of voice features to
vocal points.
3.4 Summary and Conclusion
With demanding security regulations throughout the world and the large number
of valuable services provided using the Internet and other networked media, the
assurance of secure and privacy preserving identity authentication became a very
crucial issue. In that regard, we have introduced a new concept for combining
multiple biometric traits to protect privacy. Our framework combines multiple bio-
metric modalities of a person in order to hide the individual biometrics and create a
non-unique multi-biometric template/identifier. We have empirically demonstrated
that such multi-biometric identifiers can be successfully used for the authentication,
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while searching or linking with other similarly generated identifiers is infeasible,
thus privacy preserving. We have successfully demonstrated the applicability of our
framework to physiological and behavioral biometric traits, namely fingerprint and
voice.
In the framework implementation where minutiae points extracted from two fin-
gerprints and merged to create a multi-biometric template, we achieved 1.9% of
equal error rate, which is comparable to the state of the art fingerprint verifica-
tion systems (although with a smaller database). Additionally, these templates are
resilient against identification and tracking, as indicated by a privacy analysis per-
formed on our system. For instance the success of searching correct person within
a database of 200 users using a single genuine fingerprint resulted in only a 24%.
The extensibility of our framework to behavioral traits is demonstrated by Cam-
likaya et al. [69]. In that work, the fingerprint minutiae were scrambled with MFCC
based feature points extracted from a vocal pass-phrase. Experimental results
showed that the scrambled point set (i.e. minutiae and voice points) is very success-
ful in authentication, while successfully hiding the user’s unique biometric features.
For this implementation, if a multi-biometric template is somehow compromised, a
new one can be regenerated by simply using another pass-phrase.
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Chapter 4
Fuzzy Vault for Privacy Protection
Juels and Sudan proposed a scheme called the fuzzy vault, which they call an error
tolerant encryption operation [13]. The fuzzy vault scheme provides a framework to
encrypt (”lock”) some secret value (eg. cryptographic key) using an unordered set
of locking elements as a key, such that someone who possesses a substantial amount
of the locking elements will be able to decrypt the secret. Security of the scheme is
based on the difficulty of the polynomial reconstruction problem.
In the context of this thesis, we elaborate on the fuzzy vault scheme and its impli-
cations on privacy issues. We utilize the fuzzy vault scheme in order to protect online
signatures from unintended access and screening. We also show how fuzzy vault can
be practically applied for biometric secret sharing. Finally, it was claimed that
fuzzy vault scheme without additional precautions is susceptible against correlation
attack. In that regard, we have implemented correlation attacks and empirically
substantiated their plausibility.
4.1 Fuzzy Vault Scheme
The fuzzy vault scheme is governed by two basic operations namely locking and
unlocking. The locking and unlocking of the vault are done as follows: Assume
that Alice wants to secure her cryptographic key S (a random bit stream) using an
arbitrary set of elements A. She selects a polynomial P (x) of degree D and encodes
S into the polynomial’s coefficients. Encoding can be achieved by slicing S into non-
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Figure 4.1: Vault Locking phase: (a) Create a polynomial by encoding the Secret as its
coefficients. (b) Project genuine features onto the polynomial: ai represents the subject’s
i’th feature. (c) Randomly create chaff points (represented by small black circles) and add
to the Vault. (d) Final appearance of the Vault, as stored to the system database.
overlapping bit chunks and then mapping these onto the coefficients. The mapping
must be invertible meaning that the coefficients can be unambiguously mapped back
to the corresponding bit chunks, which when concatenated, will reconstruct the S.
Then, Alice evaluates the polynomial at each element of her set A and stores these
evaluation pairs into the setG, whereG = {(a1, P (a1)), (a2, P (a2)), ..., (aN , P (aN))},
ai ∈ A and |A| = N . Finally, she generates a random set R of pairs such that none
of the pairs in that set lie on the polynomial; and she merges the sets G and R into
a final set, to obtain the vault, which she then makes public. Note that within the
vault, it is not known which points belong to G and which points belong to R. All
the steps required to lock a secret in the Fuzzy Vault are graphically represented in
Figure 4.1.
Now suppose that Bob has his own set of elements B and he wants to find out
(”unlock”) Alice’s secret locked in the vault. He will be able to do so only if his set
B largely overlaps with Alice’s A, so as to identify a substantial number of the pairs
that lie on the polynomial, from the vault. Given at least D+1 pairs that lie on the
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polynomial, he applies one of the known polynomial reconstruction techniques (eg.
Lagrange interpolating polynomial) to reconstruct the polynomial and thus extracts
her secret S. Notice that if Bob does not know which of the points of the vault lie
on the polynomial, it should be computationally infeasible for him to unlock the
vault.
The fuzzy vault scheme enables privacy protecting matching. Assume the fol-
lowing scenario: Alice locks her telephone number using her favorite music list. She
makes her vault public with the hopes to find someone else who shares similar mu-
sic preference. If Bob has substantially similar music list he will be able to unlock
the vault and give a call to Alice. In the above scenario, Alice is protected for
unintended calls (not disturbing her privacy) [13].
Whereas perturbation of a single bit in a key of a classical cryptosystem (eg.
AES, RSA [72, 73]) hinders decryption completely, the fuzzy vault allows for some
minor differences between the encryption and decryption keys, here the unordered
sets used to lock and unlock the vault. This fuzziness is necessary for use with
biometrics, since different measurements of the same biometric often result in quite
different signals, due to a noise in the measurement or non-linear distortions. Fur-
thermore, for most of the known biometric signals, it is hard to establish a consistent
ordering within the measured features. For instance two impressions of the same fin-
gerprint can have substantial distortion (displaced minutiae points) and the number
of features may vary between the two impressions (eg. missing/spurious minutiae).
On the other hand, it is not straightforward how to implement the fuzzy vault using
biometric data, due to the difficulty of matching the template and query biometric
signals (i.e. locking and unlocking sets, respectively) especially within the presence
of random data (the chaff points).
4.1.1 Fuzzy Vault with Fingerprints
Uludag et al. [29] demonstrated a preliminary implementation of the fuzzy vault
scheme using fingerprints. Yang and Verbauwhede [28] also implemented the fuzzy
vault with fingerprints, but they made the assumption that rotation and translation
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invariant features can be reliably extracted from minutiae, which is difficult in prac-
tice. Furthermore, they store reference minutia point along with the vault, which
may also leak some information. We will review the system by Uludag et al. as it
relates the most to our proposed scheme.
Minutia points of template and query fingerprints were used as locking and
unlocking sets, respectively, to lock a 128-bit long data (S) which forms the cryp-
tographic key. More precisely, the values obtained by concatenation of the corre-
sponding x and y coordinates of minutiae points were used as set elements. To make
sure that the desired S was unlocked from the vault through an error-prone process,
cyclic redundancy check bits (16 bits) were concatenated to S. Then, S, together
with its check bits, was divided into non-overlapping chunks (16 bits each), giving
the coefficients, of an 8th degree polynomial. To lock the secret, template minutiae
set was projected onto this polynomial and random chaff points not lying on the
polynomial are added, to form the vault. Based on their empirical estimations, they
used only 18 minutia points and 200 chaff points.
To unlock the secret, i.e. reconstruct S, they first match the query minutia
set with the abscissa part of the vault and identify candidate points lying on the
polynomial. Since D + 1 points are required to reconstruct a polynomial of degree
D, all possible 9 point combinations of the candidate set are tried for reconstruction,
to find the one resulting with the correct check bits. S is successfully unlocked when
the check bits verify. Authors report a 79% of correct reconstruction rate with 0%
false accept rate.
To bypass the problem of matching the minutiae points and finding an up-
per bound for the performance of the scheme, the authors have used a fingerprint
database where minutia points and the correspondence between template and query
fingerprints were established by an expert. During their experiments, the minutiae
sets of mating fingerprints were pre-aligned (i.e. rotated and translated) according
to the established correspondence, and used as such.
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4.2 Fuzzy Vault with Online Signatures
We demonstrate an implementation of the fuzzy vault scheme using online signa-
tures. Signature is a behavioral biometric: it is not based on the physical properties
of the individual, such as fingerprint or face, but behavioral ones. Online (dynamic)
signatures are captured by pressure-sensitive tablets that extract dynamic proper-
ties of a signature in addition to its shape. Dynamic features include the number
and order of the strokes, the overall speed of the signature, the pen pressure at
each point, etc. and make the signature more unique and more difficult to forge,
compared to oﬄine signatures consisting of only the image of the signature.
During either of the vault’s phases, the user first provides his/her signature using
a pressure sensitive tablet. We use the event points of a signature (here after called
event points or minutiae points, to make a parallel to fingerprint minutiae) and
use these points as locking or unlocking sets. Event points of a signature consists
of crossings, endings and places of high curvature. Each such event point is a
two dimensional point (i.e. contains x and y coordinates) defined in the Cartesian
space of the pressure sensitive tablet. Figure 4.2 demonstrates an example, where
event/minutiae points are extracted for the provided signature. The decision to
use this representation was mainly due to easily extending the available fuzzy vault
implementation with fingerprints to handle online signatures. However, Brault and
Plamondon [74] report that curved segments of a signature are making it more
complex and difficult to forge, thus our signature minutiae points do possess some
of the most important information about a signature.
For the time being minutiae points were marked by experts, i.e. they were not
extracted automatically. This was done in order to measure true performance of
the vault, i.e. reduce error propagation which could be introduced by an imperfect
minutiae extraction algorithm.
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Figure 4.2: A genuine signature (top) and minutiae points marked for that signature
(bottom).
4.2.1 Vault Locking
We adopt the notation of Juels et. al [13], while describing the locking and unlock-
ing algorithms. First, a polynomial P of degree D is created by encoding a secret
key S into the polynomial’s coefficients (P ←D S denotes the encoding). The poly-
nomial degree was fixed at 9 and didn’t change during our experiments. Minutiae
point coordinates are then concatenated (a = xi|yi denotes the concatenation) and
projected onto the polynomial, to give P (a). Minutiae coordinates and their corre-
sponding projections constitute the locking set of the vault. In the pseudo code of
the locking algorithm, N denotes the cardinality of the minutiae point set.
Then, chaff points are created as described in the Section 4.1. We randomly
select chaff points such that they don’t intersect with any other vault point and
that they don’t lie on the polynomial P . In the pseudo code implementation of the
locking algorithm (depicted in the Figure 4.3), K denotes the overall number of the
points in the vault such that D < N << K; and V is the constructed vault.
Although not explicitly denoted in the locking algorithm, special attention must
be paid to situations where chaff points are generated too close to genuine points
or other chaff points. In the first case, it may reduce vaults unlocking performance
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Public parameters: A field z, a degree D of the polynomial.
Input parameters: Minutiae point set M {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 and a secret key S.
Output: A set V of points {(xi, yi)}Ki=1, a cryptographic hash of S, hash(S) .
Locking Algorithm
V = ∅;
P ←D S;
for i= 1 to N do
a = xi|yi; where (xi, yi)²M .
(x, y)=(a, P (a));
V = V
⋃
(x, y);
for i= N+1 to K do
randomly generate (x, y) s.t. (x, y) /∈ V and y 6= P (x)
V = V
⋃
(x, y);
Output V and hash(S);
Figure 4.3: A fuzzy vault locking algorithm using signature minutiae point set.
since a chaff point located in close proximity to a genuine point may be mistak-
enly matched during the unlocking phase. On the other hand, closely generated
chaff points may leak information if a malicious attacker knows the closest possible
distance between two genuine points. Additionally, chaff points must be homoge-
neously distributed in the vault space. Otherwise, ill-generated chaff points may
leak information, enabling a malicious attacker to reduce his search space and de-
crease the vault’s strength. Figure 4.4 shows a sample Vault which is generated
within this system.
4.2.2 Vault Un-Locking
During the unlocking phase, the correspondence between the points of the unlock-
ing minutiae set and those of the vault must be determined. Although there are
numerous point matching algorithms, we used exhaustive matching to reduce the
error that may be introduced by the matching algorithm. Exhaustive matching is
performed by applying all possible rotations and translations (in the Vault space)
to the unlocking set, in order to find the alignment with the greatest number of
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Figure 4.4: The locking of the Fuzzy Vault using on-line signatures: genuine points (stars)
and chaff points (dots) are represented differently (left) for the sake of clarity. The actual
vault as it is stored to the system’s database (right).
matching points. In the scope of the unlocking algorithm illustrated in the Figure
4.5, the function transform takes a point set M and transforms it according to the
rotation (r) and translation (t) parameters, while the
⋂
indicates a match with some
tolerance. Figure 4.6 shows the result of matching a genuine (left) and a forgery
(right) minutiae set with the vault (matching points are circled). As can be seen,
while the genuine unlocking set substantially overlaps with the vault’s locking set
(i.e. genuine points), the forgery set did not.
As a result of matching, we obtain a candidate set of points (C) which are
then used for decoding the secret. The decoding is performed using the Lagrange
polynomial interpolation method and denoted by reconstruct(fi, D). During each
iteration of the decoding phase, we select D+1 points (where D is the degree of the
polynomial and fi indicates selected points) from the candidate set C (comb(C,D+
1) indicates a set of all available D+1 point combinations) and use them to decode
the secret, as described in the Section 4.1. We calculate the hash of the decoded
secret and compare it with the one stored in the system’s database. Decoding phase
terminates when both hash values match (the secret is revealed) or when a maximum
number of unlocking attempts (T ) is reached (the unlocking failed).
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Public parameters: A field z, a degree D of the polynomial, a set T of transla-
tions, a set R of rotations.
Input parameters: Query minutiae point set M {(xi, yi)}Ni=1, a vault V, a hash(S).
Output: The secret S or ∅.
Unlocking Algorithm
C = ∅;
for all r ² R do
for all t ² T do
M ′ = transform(M |r, t);
C ′ =M ′
⋂
V ;
if |C ′| > |C|
C = C ′;
S ′=Decode(C,hash(S));
Output S ′;
Public parameters: Maximum reconstruction trials T, polynomial degree D.
Input parameters: A polynomial evaluation set C {(ai, P (ai))}Ni=1, a hash(S).
Output: A secret S or ∅.
Decode Algorithm
for i=0 to T do
fi ² comb(C,D+1) ;
S ′=reconstruct(fi,D);
if hash(S ′) == hash(S)
Output S ′;
else
S ′ = ∅;
Output S ′
Figure 4.5: A fuzzy vault unlocking algorithm using signature minutiae point set.
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Figure 4.6: Fuzzy Vault Matching using on-line signatures: genuine (left) and forgery
(right) minutiae sets are matched with the Vault, respectively. Matched Vault points are
circled. For the sake of clarity, minutiae (stars) and chaff (dots) points are represented
differently.
4.2.3 Experiments
The system performance was evaluated using sample signatures supplied by 10 sub-
jects enrolled to our system. All signatures in our dataset were acquired using the
same tablet and sampled at 100 sample points per second rate. Each subject sup-
plied 4 genuine signatures for a total of 40 signatures. There were no constraints
on how to sign, nor was any information given about the working principles of the
system, so that the subjects signed in their most natural way.
All possible combinations of 2 signatures out of 4 reference signatures supplied
by each subject, were used to measure the vault’s genuine performance (i.e. correct
unlocking rate of the vault). Thus, 6 such signature pairs were obtained for each
user and totally 60 of such pairs were obtained for the whole dataset.
To collect skilled forgeries, we added a signing simulation module to our system.
The simulation module animates the signing process of a given signature so that
the forger could see not only the signature trajectory, but also the signing dynamics
(speed and acceleration). Forgers had a chance of watching the signature’s animation
several times and practice tracing over the signature image a few times before forging
it. We have collected 30 skilled forgeries (3 forgeries for each subject), following the
above mentioned protocol. Each forgery signature was paired with each of the
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corresponding reference signatures (4 such pairs per forgery signature) and used as
such during the locking and unlocking phases, where the reference signature was
used to lock and forgery signature to unlock the vault, respectively. A dataset of
120 such pairs was created and used to measure the weakness of the vault against
attacks where the forger practiced the locking signature.
We obtained 8.33% failure rate to unlock the vault when a genuine signature was
presented (which can be considered as false reject rate) and 2.50% false unlocking
rate when the vault was attempted to be opened using forgery signatures (which
can be considered as false accept rate). Obtained results are promising: most of the
failures to unlock the vault with genuine signatures are due to the high variability
within the reference signatures supplied by the user. On the other hand, the false
unlocking rate obtained used forgery signatures is due to the fact that only minutiae
points, and not the dynamics of the signature, were used. The false accept rate can
be reduced by increasing the polynomial degree, of course at the expense of some
increase in FRR. Conversely, FRR can be lowered by more efficient chaff point
generation, which could assure that number of genuine points matching chaff points
doesn’t exceed a certain threshold. On average, it took approximately 30 seconds
to unlock a vault with it’s corresponding genuine signature. Throughout the test,
a notebook computer with Intel Celeron (M) 1.5GHz and 512 megabyte of RAM
hardware configuration was used. All algorithms were implemented using Matlab.
4.3 Secret Sharing Using Biometric Traits
In biometric based authentication, biometric traits of a person are matched against
his/her stored biometric profile and access is granted if there is sufficient match.
However, there are other access scenarios that require the participation of multiple
previously registered users for a successful authentication or to get an access right.
There are cryptographic constructs generally known as secret sharing schemes,
where a secret is split into shares and distributed amongst the participants in such
a way that it is reconstructed/revealed only when the necessary number of share
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holders come together. The revealed secret can then be used for encryption or
authentication (if the revealed key is verified against the previously registered value).
We propose a method for the biometric based secret sharing. Instead of splitting
a secret amongst participants, as is done in a cryptographic secret sharing, a single
biometric construct is created using the biometric traits of the participants. During
authentication, a valid cryptographic key is released out of the construct when the
required number of genuine participants present their biometric traits. The method
uses the fuzzy vault construct suggested by Juels et al. [13].
4.3.1 Cryptographic Secret Sharing
Shamir first proposed a method (known as threshold scheme) for secret sharing,
which can be defined as follows in the most general form [75]:
Definition: Let T and N be positive integers with T ≤ N . A (T,N)-threshold
scheme is a method of sharing a secret S among a set of N participants such
that any subset of T participants can reconstruct the secret S, but fewer than T
participants cannot.
Shamir’s scheme is based on encoding a secret S as the constant term of a
polynomial of degree T − 1, whose coefficients, which are kept secret, are smaller
than a certain prime p. Hence, the polynomial can be given as follows:
P (x) = S + c1x+ c2x
2 + . . .+ cT−1xT−1 (mod p)
The polynomial is then evaluated forN randomly chosen distinct integers x1, x2, . . . xN
(mod p) and each participant is given a pair (xi, yi) with yi ≡ P (xi) (mod p), where
i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The prime p is known to all participants, but the polynomial P (x)
is kept secret.
The polynomial, P (x), whose degree is T − 1 can be reconstructed if any T
distinct evaluation pairs (xL1 , yL1), . . . , (xLT , yLT ) are known, using Lagrange inter-
polation method. Consequently, any T participants from the set of N participants
can come together and reconstruct P (x) and hence find out the secret S, which is
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the constant term. The secret can be used in many ways in a security context such
as encryption, decryption, authentication, signatures, etc.
In this proposed scheme, the distinct integers xi (i = 0, . . . , N) where the poly-
nomial P (x) is evaluated, are no longer chosen at random but derived from the
biometrics of the participants; the evaluated pairs are then kept in a fuzzy vault, as
explained in the following sections.
4.3.2 Secret Sharing Using Fuzzy Vault
In this section we describe how to implement the secret sharing scheme [75], using
the fuzzy vault scheme suggested by Juels et al. [13]. As the most general form,
our secret sharing scheme implements a threshold scheme, revealing a secret when a
predetermined number of the sharing parties collaborate. Even though extending the
fuzzy vault to implement secret sharing is relatively straightforward, we addressed
a few non-trivial issues for this extension. Furthermore, this is the first biometrics-
based secret sharing scheme, to our knowledge.
Suppose N people who want to share a secret S such that at least T out of
these N people are required to reveal the secret, where T ≤ N . We use their
biometric signals G1 through GN and the secret S to construct the fuzzy vault as
follows: Assume for simplicity that the biometric signal is one dimensional such
that Gi = {gi1, gi2, ...giLi}, where i denotes the participant’s ID; gij denotes a scalar
measurement in the signal; and Li denotes length of the signal. We assume that the
length of each party’s biometric signal is greater than or equal to some fixed length
K, i.e. Li ≥ K. We select K out of each of the Li measured features and the rest
are discarded.
Next, we pick a polynomial P (x) of degree D such that (T−1)K ≤ D ≤ TK−1,
where P (x) = cDx
D + cD−1xD−1 + · · · + c1x + c0, ci denotes the i’th coefficient of
the polynomial. Note that to reconstruct such a polynomial, biometric features of
at least T parties are required, as intended. The coefficients may be determined as
described in Section 4.3.1, where S can be used as the constant term. The other
way is to divide S into non-overlapping bit chunks and then map these chunks onto
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the coefficients.
After fixing the polynomial, we compute projections of each participant’s bio-
metric signal (i.e. Gi’s) onto the polynomial, and obtain evaluation pair sets denoted
by Ai = {(gij, P (gij), . . . (giK , P (giK)}. Next we create a set C of M random chaff
points, where C = {(r1, P (d1)), . . . , (rM , P (dM))}, where ri and di are random num-
bers. Random points are generated in such a way that non of them coincide with
genuine points or lie on the polynomial; i.e. rl 6= dl and rl 6= gij. Finally, the genuine
sets Ai’s and the set of chaff points C are merged and shuﬄed to constitute the fuzzy
vault, V . The number of chaff points M must be selected such that identifying the
required number of genuine evaluation pairs (i.e. D+1 of them) without possessing
the required number of genuine biometric traits will be computationally hard for an
adversary or a malicious group of genuine participants (a group smaller than T).
When a group of T genuine participants decide to reconstruct the secret, they
submit their corresponding biometrics that are used to match the abscissa part of
the fuzzy vault’s points, one person at a time. Then, the identified points of the
vault are used for the polynomial reconstruction and the secret will be extracted, in
the way described in Section 4.1.
Note that the template minutiae of a person can match at most K genuine points
(which is enough to reconstruct the selected polynomial) and possibly some chaff
points and some of the other parties’ genuine points. The matched chaff points are
handled the same way as in the fuzzy vault implementation, by examining some
subset of the matched points and checking the hash code. Matching other genuine
points is more important, because it would leave fewer than K points to be matched
by the true owner, as well as possibly compromising the sharing scheme by causing
a situation where less than T genuine participants could match D+1 genuine vault
points. This is handled by spacing apart each set of genuine K features from each
other. For instance, if secret sharing is performed using fingerprint minutiae, as in
this work, then each K minutiae can be translated to different parts of the vault
space. Alternatively, the degree of the polynomial can be selected closer to it’s
possible upper bound (i.e. TK − 1) to lower the risk of revealing the secret to less
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than T genuine participants. However this can also possibly increase the false reject
rate of the sharing scheme.
This problem can also be addressed during the selection of K of the features.
which can be done in a couple of different ways: according to the significance of the
corresponding features (i.e. select K most discriminative features for each party);
or randomly, if each feature conveys an equal amount of information. During the
selection process it may happen that some of the K features selected for different
parties do clash (i.e. gim = gjn), which would be undesirable because it would
result in fewer than expected number of genuine points within the fuzzy vault, as
mentioned above. To resolve this, different strategies could be adopted as suitable:
i) if available, replace gin or gjm with another feature of the corresponding party,
ii) transform (eg. affine) gi or gj so that they don’t overlap, iii) reduce K, or iv)
reduce degree of the polynomial. Selection of a strategy will depend on a biometric
signal used, a number of participants (N) and the security level. In particular, in
our implementation with fingerprints, we selected the points around the center of
mass of the corresponding minutiae set (to reduce the areas which are more prone
to occlusion) and translated them in the vault space to avoid clashes (see Sec. 4.3.3
for details).
4.3.3 Implementation
In this section we present the implementation of the secret sharing scheme using
fingerprints. First, we describe our own implementation of fuzzy vault for finger-
prints and then demonstrate its utilization for secret sharing. Our implementation
of the fuzzy vault follows similar locking and unlocking steps as used in Uludag et
al. However our system is fully automatic: corresponding locking and unlocking
sets are not pre-aligned, which makes it suitable for real life applications.
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Figure 4.7: The locking of the Fuzzy Vault using fingerprints: minutiae (stars) and chaff
(dots) points are represented differently (left) for the sake of clarity. The actual vault
(right) as it is stored to the system database.
Fuzzy Vault Implementation
Our implementation of the fuzzy vault using fingerprints is based on that of Uludag
et al. [29] presented in 4.1; however, ours has an automatic matcher and other small
modifications, as explained in this section.
In addition to the positional information, each minutiae is also associated with
a number of other features, such as the angle of the ridge at the minutiae location,
the gray level profile around minutia, as well as different counts of and distances
to neighboring minutiae, etc. However, features besides the x,y-coordinates may
leak information (i.e. reveal genuine points in the vault), and thus are not used.
We concatenate the x and y coordinates of minutiae points and project these onto
the secret polynomial, as described in Section 4.1. Minutiae coordinates and their
corresponding projections constitute the locking set of the vault.
Then, random chaff points are created, again as described in 4.1. It is worth to
mention that chaff points must not be too close to genuine points and each other;
there must be at least a distance equal to the inter-ridge distance (approximately 16
pixels in 500 dpi images). Also chaff points must be homogeneously distributed in
the vault space. Otherwise, ill-generated chaff points may leak information, enabling
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Figure 4.8: The matching of the Fuzzy Vault with genuine (left) and forgery (right) query
minutiae sets. Matched vault points are circled.
a malicious attacker to reduce his search space and decrease the vault’s strength.
Figure 4.7 shows a sample vault which is generated within this system.
During the unlocking phase, the correspondence between the minutiae points of
the unlocking set and those of the vault must be determined. Although there are
numerous point matching algorithms, we used exhaustive matching to reduce the
error that may be introduced by the matching algorithm. Exhaustive matching is
performed by applying all possible rotations and translations (in the vault space) to
the unlocking set, to find the alignment with the most number of matching points.
Figure 4.8 shows the result of matching genuine (left) and forgery (right) minutiae
sets with the vault (matched vault points are circled). As can be seen, while genuine
unlocking set substantially overlaps with the vault’s genuine points, the forgery set
did not.
As a result of matching, we obtain a candidate set of points consisting of matched
genuine and chaff points. During each iteration of the decoding phase, we select
D + 1 (where D is the degree of the polynomial) points from the candidate set and
use them to try to decode the secret as described in Section 4.1. The polynomial
degree was fixed at 9 and didn’t change during testing. During the locking phase, a
cryptographic hash of the secret is also stored in the system database, along with the
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vault points. In each decoding attempt, we calculate the hash of the decoded secret
and compare it with the one stored in the system’s database. The decoding phase
terminates when both hash values match (secret is decoded) or when maximum
number of iterations is performed (secret not revealed).
Secret Sharing Implementation
In this section we demonstrate the utilization of the fuzzy vault described above,
for secret sharing. In our sample scenario, 3 users share a secret such that at least
2 of them must present their fingerprints to reveal the secret.
During the locking phase, for each participant we select 13 of his/her minutiae
points, discarding the rest. The selection of minutiae is performed around the center
of mass of the corresponding fingerprint, to reduce possible matching errors caused
by occlusions. During the selection process, we follow the guidelines introduced in
Section 4.3.2. Hence, a total of 39 (13x3) minutiae are used in the locking set.
As described in Section 4.3.2, the degree (D) of the polynomial to which the
secret is to be encoded must satisfy the following condition (T−1)K ≤ D ≤ TK−1,
where T denotes the minimum number of participants required to reveal the secret
and K denotes the number of features each participant possesses. Thus, any degree
between 13 and 25 will satisfy the requirements; we used a degree of 17. The locking
set is then projected onto the polynomial, forming the vault’s genuine points.
In the next step, random chaff points are generated, as was done in Section 4.3.3.
We should mention that, during chaff point generation, discarded genuine minutiae
are also considered as if they were present in the vault. This is done to reduce false
reject rate, since chaff points generated close enough (less than inter-ridge distance)
to places where the discarded minutiae were located may match with minutiae of
the unlocking set.
The scheme requires at least participants to present their minutiae. During
the unlocking phase, the minutiae set of each of the two participants is matched
sequentially with the vault, as described in Section 4.3.3. Matched vault points are
discarded before subsequent match. Figure 4.9 demonstrates the vault (left) and
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Figure 4.9: Secret sharing using fuzzy vault. The vault is created using fingerprint minutiae
of 3 different users (left). The vault is matched using query minutiae of two genuine users
(right).
the result of matching the vault with unlocking minutiae sets (right). As a result of
matching, a candidate set of points is obtained, which is then used for decoding the
secret as is done in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.4 Experiments
We used a dataset of 200 different fingerprints with 2 imprints per finger (400 im-
prints total), to test both the success of the vault implementation and the success
of the secret sharing scheme. Minutiae locations were manually labeled by experts.
To test the fuzzy vault system’s performance, we tried to unlock a vault with
either the minutiae set of the matching fingerprint (genuine) or the minutiae set of
an non-matching fingerprint (forgery). Minutiae correspondences were found auto-
matically by the system during the unlocking process. In these tests, we achieved a
4% false accept rate (FAR) and a 6.5% false reject rate (FRR). In comparison, the
results of Uludag et al. were 21% FRR and 0% FAR using manually aligned minu-
tiae sets. The false accept rate can be reduced by increasing the polynomial degree,
of course at the expense of slight increase in FRR. Conversely, FRR can be lowered
by more efficient chaff point generation, which could assure that number of genuine
55
points matching chaff points doesn’t exceed a certain threshold. On average, it took
approximately 40 seconds to unlock a vault with it’s corresponding genuine finger-
print. Throughout the test a notebook computer with Intel Celeron (M) 1.5GHz
and 512 megabyte of RAM hardware configuration was used. All algorithms were
implemented using Matlab.
The secret sharing scheme’s performance was tested using the same dataset.
To share a secret, fingerprints of 3 participants are required to lock the vault. We
randomly created 400 triplets of fingerprint imprints to lock the vaults. To reveal the
secret, any 2 out of 3 participants must submit their fingerprints. For each triplet,
there are 3 different combinations of 2 genuine participants. Thus, a total of 1200
unlocking attempts were made with genuine minutiae sets, to measure FRR. To test
the performance of the system against forgeries (FAR), we simulated the case where
only one person tries to unlock the secret, by using one genuine fingerprint and
one random forgery fingerprint. 1200 unique unlocking attempts were performed
to accomplish this task. In these tests, we achieved 0% of FAR (only one of the
genuine participants attempts to unlock the vault) and 10.5% FRR (2 of the genuine
participants attempt to unlock the vault).
4.4 Realization of Correlation Attack Against the
Fuzzy Vault Scheme
It was recently claimed that the fuzzy vault scheme is susceptible to correlation based
attacks, if two or more fuzzy vaults created using the same biometric data (e.g. two
impressions of the same fingerprint) were available. It suggests that correlating them
would reveal the biometric data hidden inside [76].
In this part of the thesis, we performed correlation attacks against a database of
400 fuzzy vaults (200 matching pairs), created using our implementation described
in Section 4.3.3. Given two matching vaults, we could successfully unlock 59% of
them within a short time. Furthermore, it was possible to link an unknown vault to
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a short list containing its matching pair, for 41% of all vaults. These results prove
the claim that the fuzzy vault scheme without additional security measures is indeed
vulnerable to correlation attacks.
4.4.1 Attacks on Fuzzy Vault
Scheirer et al. [76] suggests a number of attacks targeted on the fuzzy vault scheme.
They classify suggested attacks into 3 groups: i) attacks via record multiplicity, ii)
stolen key-inversion attack, and iii) blended substitution attack.
Attacks via record multiplicity assume that an attacker intercepts multiple enroll-
ments/encodings which are created using the same biometric data (e.g. two fuzzy
vaults created using imprints of the same fingerprint, but different chaff points).
Scheirer et al. claimed that correlation of two such enrollments may reveal the
biometric data encoded within each enrollment, suggesting that a correlation peak
must occur at the point where biometric data of corresponding encodings overlap
the most.
Stolen key-inversion attack assumes that an attacker obtains a secret key which
is released upon the presentation of a genuine biometric to a corresponding system.
The attacker could obtain that key by means of social engineering or weak coupling
between different modules of the system, etc. Then, the attacker may retrieve the
biometric data from its corresponding encoding, by utilizing this key. In the case of
fuzzy vault, it is a straightforward task to identify genuine and chaff points given the
key (i.e. the polynomial coefficients) is known: Using the key, one would compute
p(x) for each given x and verify which of the vault points (chaff or biometric) actually
have the correct p(x), hence correspond to the biometric.
Finally, the blended substitution attack considers the scenario where a malicious
attacker injects his own data into someone’s template. After such injection, both
genuine and malicious users will be positively authenticated against the same en-
rollment record. In the case of the fuzzy vault scheme, during the vault construction
the attacker would insert his own minutiae points, possibly using his own secret (i.e.
polynomial). When the attacker later presents his fingerprint for the verification,
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the genuine user‘s minutiae points will act as chaff points and the attacker will get
authenticated. While the implementation of this attack may not be straightforward,
it is obvious that the fuzzy vault may be susceptible for this type of attack. In fact,
Kholmatov et al. [77] exploited this additive property of the fuzzy vault scheme to
implement a biometric based secret sharing.
Scheirer et al. only suggested the aforementioned attacks, without providing any
particular implementations. As the success of stolen key-inversion attacks against
the fuzzy vault scheme is mostly obvious, the success of the other two attacks must
be substantiated. In this work, we address this issue and empirically assess the
vulnerability of the fuzzy vault scheme against record multiplicity attacks.
Note that recently Nandakumar et al [78] described and implemented a fuzzy
vault that is hardened using passwords, to eliminate some of the weaknesses of
the fuzzy vault scheme. Specifically, they construct the fuzzy vault after trans-
forming (translation and rotation) the fingerprint minutiae, effectively eliminating
correlation-based attacks. However, their scheme causes some increase in the False
Reject Rate due to the matching being carried in the transformed space. Further-
more, considering the case where the password may be compromised, the vulnera-
bility of the vault remains to be quantified.
4.4.2 Implementation of Correlation Based Attacks
We suggest to assess the feasibility of the correlation attack under three different
scenarios: i) given two fuzzy vaults locked using the same biometric trait but dif-
ferent chaff points and different secrets (i.e. different polynomials), is it practically
possible to reconstruct the secrets encoded in their corresponding vaults? ii) given a
fuzzy vault belonging to an unknown person and a set of vaults linked to their cor-
responding identities, what is the success rate of correctly identifying the unknown
person using the correlation attack? iii) given two sets of vaults, how likely is it to
find the correspondences of the vaults in these sets? Note that the second scenario
is a subtask of the third.
We carried our experiments on the fuzzy vaults created using our fingerprint-
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Figure 4.10: Alignments of two vaults, created using different impressions of the same
fingerprint (left) and completely different fingerprints (right). Crosses represent fingerprint
minutiae, dots identify chaff points. Minutiae and chaff points of a corresponding vault
are colored by the same color (red or black) and matching points are also circled.
based fuzzy vault construction scheme [77], described in Section 4.3.3. The finger-
print database used to construct the fuzzy vaults consists of 400 fingerprint images
(2 different impressions for each of 200 different fingers) acquired with an optical
sensor and with manually labeled minutiae points. Using this database, we created
a fuzzy vault from each fingerprint (a total of 200 fuzzy vaults pairs). Each fuzzy
vault is locked using different chaff points and different secrets (i.e. different polyno-
mials). The number of chaff points added to each vault was 200 and the polynomial
degree was set to 8, as used in [29,77].
4.4.3 Unlocking Two Matching Fuzzy Vaults
In order to assess the feasibility of the first scenario, we matched each vault pair
using exhaustive matching, seeking the best alignment between two vaults over all
of their relative rotations and translations. The best alignment is decided as the
one which maximizes the number of matching points between the two vaults. We
follow the notation established in the Section 4.2 while outlining the pseudo code for
the vault cracking algorithm depicted in the Figure 4.11, which indeed parallels the
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vault unlocking algorithm described in the mentioned section. Figure 4.10 depicts
the alignments of two vaults created using the same (on the left) and different (on
the right) fingerprints. As can be seen, genuine points align very well for the vaults
created using the same fingerprint, while that is not the case for non-matching
vaults.
After the alignment, we obtain two candidate point sets (CA, CB), one for each
of the two vaults, containing a mixture of genuine and chaff points. The vault(s) can
be unlocked if i) the number of matching minutiae points (M) within a candidate
set is sufficient to decode the polynomial of degree D (i.e. M ≥ D + 1) and ii) the
total number of matching points (N) is not too large with respect to M , so that the
brute force attack (i.e. trying all possible combinations of D + 1 out of N points)
to reconstruct the polynomial is computationally feasible. The expected number of
attempts (A) to unlock one of the vaults can be formulated as follows:
A =
 N
D + 1

 M
D + 1

During our experiments, we observed that on the average there are 43 match-
ing points (i.e. N) between corresponding vaults, where 22 out of these points are
minutiae points (i.e. M). Based on the above formulation, 1133 attempts are re-
quired on the average to reconstruct corresponding vaults and the whole process
(exhaustive matching and decoding attempts) takes approximately 50 seconds for
a non-optimized Matlab implementation on a PC with 3GHz CPU and 8 GByte
RAM. Notice that once we unlock one of the vaults, separating chaff and minutiae
points is done, and unlocking the second vault is straightforward.
Using this method, we could successfully reconstruct 59% of the corresponding
fuzzy vault pairs (i.e. 118 out 200) created using our fingerprint database. This
success rate is enough to conclude that the fuzzy vault is indeed vulnerable against
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Public parameters: A field z, a degree D of the polynomial, a set T of transla-
tions, a set R of rotations.
Input parameters: Two vaults VA and VB, cryptographic hashes of their secrets
hash(SA) and hash(SB).
Output: (SA, SB) or ∅.
Vault Cracking Algorithm
CA, CB = ∅;
for all r ² R do
for all t ² T do
V ′A = transform(VA|r, t);
(C ′A, C
′
B) = V
′
A
⋂
VB;
if |C ′A| > |CA|
CA = C
′
A;
CB = C
′
B;
S ′A=Decode(CA,hash(SA));
S ′B=Decode(CB,hash(SB));
Output (S ′A, S
′
B);
Public parameters: Maximum reconstruction trials A, polynomial degree D.
Input parameters: A polynomial evaluation set C {(ai, P (ai))}Ni=1, a hash(S).
Output: A secret S or ∅.
Decode Algorithm
for i=0 to T do
fi ² comb(C,D+1) ;
S ′=reconstruct(fi,D);
if hash(S ′) == hash(S)
Output S ′
else
S ′ = ∅;
Output S ′
Figure 4.11: An algorithm for unlocking two matching fuzzy vaults.
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correlation attacks. In order to increase the success rate, one could also try to use
alignments where the number of matching points exceed certain threshold, instead
of using only the best alignment.
4.4.4 Correlating Two Databases
The success rates of last two scenarios mentioned in Section 4.4.2 are assessed by
matching each fuzzy vault with the rest of the available vaults (399 matches for our
database), to simulate the situation where one vault would be matched to all the
vaults in a separate database.
In matching one vault against all others, it is reasonable to expect that the
alignment with the corresponding vaults (i.e. those created using different impres-
sions of the same fingerprint) would result in the highest number of matching points
(i.e. N), compared to the alignments with non-matching vaults. We tried to vali-
date this expectation and aligned each vault with all of the remaining vaults in the
database and picked one with the highest number of matching points for decoding.
This process returned the matching vault as the top-choice for 24% of all the vaults
(96/400). When we considered top-10 choices, the matching vault was found for
41% of all the vaults. Since unlocking attempts for a vault takes a short time, an
attacker who wants to find a matching vault can find the best aligned vaults and
try to decode them all in turn, succeeding with a high probability in a reasonable
time (50sec× 10 attempts = 8min, in the worst case for our implementation).
These experiments support the claim that the fuzzy vault scheme without ad-
ditional security enhancing measures such as the one suggested by Nandakumar et
al [78], is vulnerable to correlation attacks. On the other hand, such attacks will
not succeed if the fuzzy vault is locked using behavioral traits such as signature or
voice. In such case, the user will have to lock vaults used for different applications
with distinct instances of his/her behavioral traits (eg. using different signatures or
vocal pass phrases for different applications).
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4.5 Summary and Conclusion
Bio-cryptosystems combine cryptography and biometrics to take advantage of the
benefits of both fields: while biometrics provide non-repudiation and convenience,
traditional cryptography provides adjustable levels of security and can be used not
just for authentication, but also for encryption. The fuzzy vault has emerged as a
promising method for such synergy. The scheme is based on binding the biometric
template with a secret key and scrambling it with a large amount of redundant
data, such that it is computationally infeasible to extract the secret key without
possession of the biometric trait. Fuzzy vault doesn’t require ordered representation
of a biometric and it can tolerate variations within a biometric, up to some extent.
In the context of this work, we demonstrated a fully automatic and practical
implementation of the fuzzy vault scheme using fingerprints and online signatures.
Even though our implementations are relatively straightforward extensions of the
implementation by Uludag et al. [29], the issues encountered in implementing the
fuzzy vault with online signatures were non-trivial. Besides, it is the first realization
of the scheme using online signatures which demonstrated promising performance
results.
The secret sharing is a well-known family of cryptographic protocols. It pro-
vides guidelines for the release of a secret key upon providing a predefined number
of shares required to reconstruct the key. We demonstrated secret sharing using
biometric traits by utilizing the fuzzy vault scheme. The resulting scheme enhances
traditional secret sharing scheme proposed by Shamir [75], in that it benefits from
convenience and non-repudiation provided by biometrics. Even though it is a rela-
tively straightforward extension of the fuzzy vault scheme, the issues encountered in
implementing the fuzzy vault with multiple people and implementing the threshold
scheme were non-trivial.
Finally, it was recently claimed that the fuzzy vault scheme is susceptible against
correlation attacks, however without any proof. In the context of this work, we
implemented correlation attacks and empirically assessed the vulnerability of the
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fuzzy vault scheme against these attacks.
We implemented the fuzzy vault scheme using fingerprints and found that using
a database of 400 fingerprint impressions, we were able to successfully unlock 59% of
the vaults created using different impressions of the same fingerprint. Additionally,
we showed that for 41% of all the cases, it was possible to link an unknown vault
to a small set of vaults containing the matching vault. This results prove the claim
that the fuzzy vaults scheme without additional security measures is vulnerable to
such attacks.
On the other hand, such attacks will not succeed if the fuzzy vault will be
locked using behavioral traits such as signature or voice. In such case, the user will
have to lock vaults used for different applications with distinct instances of his/her
behavioral traits (eg. using different signatures or vocal pass phrases for different
applications).
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Chapter 5
Individuality Model for On-line Signatures
In this part of the thesis, we study the discriminative capability of online signatures
as it directly relates to the success of using online signatures in the available privacy
preserving biometric verification systems such as fuzzy vault and multi-biometric
templates approaches.
The discriminative capability of a biometric is based on its individuality/uniqueness
and is an important factor in choosing a biometric for a large-scale deployment or a
cryptographic application. Individuality studies have been carried out rigorously for
only certain biometrics, in particular fingerprint and iris, while work on establishing
handwriting and signature individuality has been mainly on feature level. In this
part of the thesis, we present an individuality model for online signatures using the
Fourier domain representation of the signature. Specifically, using the normalized
Fourier coefficients as global features describing the signature, we derive a formula
for the probability of coincidentally matching a given signature.
5.1 Introduction
With increased popularity of biometric verification systems, new biometric modali-
ties are introduced every year (e.g. tongue shape). The performance of a biometric
verification system is commonly reported using false accept and false reject rates
(FAR and FRR, respectively). These performance measures depend on the verifi-
cation algorithm and more importantly, the particular database used in testing the
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system; hence they do not truly represent the discriminative capability of the cor-
responding biometric data, nor do they provide performance estimates for the cases
where corresponding biometric would be deployed to the general public.
The discriminative capability of a biometric modality is based on its individu-
ality/uniqueness across the population and can be measured as the probability of
a coincidental match between the biometric data of two different subjects. This
probability depends on the concept of entropy [79] which denotes the number of bits
of information present in a certain message or event. For instance, in a classical
password-based system, the security of the system depends on how easy it is to
guess a password, which in turn depends on the number of available passwords. As
a simple example, assuming a uniform probability model, 4 digit pin-codes used in
ATM cards have a 1/10000 chance of being guessed; equivalently, they possess a
−log2(1/10000) = 14 bits of entropy. Within the context of biometric individuality,
the term guessing entropy [80, 81] is used in particular, to emphasize that entropy
results are obtained considering random guesses. This distinction is more relevant in
the context of signatures, or behavioral biometrics in general, where skilled forgeries
present a bigger challenge. Nonetheless, it is important to know how easy it would
be to guess a random, average online signature without knowing anything about
it. This is comparable to guessing someone’s ATM pin without knowing anything
about the person.
Individuality studies have been carried out empirically or theoretically, for only
certain biometrics to the best of our knowledge: some work is done towards estab-
lishing handwriting [82, 83], voice [84, 85] and signature [86, 87] individuality, while
more comprehensive studies are carried out for fingerprint [88,89] and iris [20,90,91].
Empirical studies consider data from a large and representative population to
assess the individuality of the biometric as the minimum dissimilarity between non-
matching samples. For instance, Daugman has shown that with respect to a given
representation (IrisCode) and a matching algorithm, genuine and forgery popula-
tions show clearly separated distributions [20], corresponding to a Binomial distribu-
tion with 173 bits of freedom; concluding that an iris carries 173 bits of information.
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Theoretical studies try to break the dependence upon the current database by
considering the probability of match within the whole parameter space of a particular
representation. However, they also depend on a particular representation and a
matching algorithm (preferably well-accepted ones), and even a database commonly
used to estimate certain parameters; hence the distinction between two definitions
is not very clear-cut. Nonetheless, there is a distinction which is due to the fact that
the estimates calculated in theoretical studies are in general in lower level features
(e.g. how far apart can two matching minutiae points are), whereas empirical models
estimate the guessing entropy on the higher level features (e.g. how likely it is to
match a fixed number of minutiae in a fingerprint). Theoretical studies are very
useful in estimating the performance of a verification algorithm when deployed in a
large-scale application, because lower level statistics can be obtained more reliably in
smaller size databases. In the case of empirical approaches, it is important to obtain
a large enough and statistically representative biometric samples. Furthermore,
the similarity comparisons may be prohibitively time consuming. On the other
hand, theoretical approaches face the difficulty of realistically modeling all available
dimensions of a biometric and formulating the likelihood of coincidental match.
It is important to note that any individuality model must be done with respect
to a given feature representation, as well as a matching algorithm in order to allow
for intra-class variations within the biometric with respect to inter-class variations
(variations within the biometric measurements of a person and those between the
measurements of a person and those of the forgers for that person). Simply calcu-
lating the entropy of a biometric signal without regard to the intra-class variations
would result in an unrealistically optimistic entropy measure. Due to this depen-
dence, individuality measurements of biometrics may be refined in time as more
powerful features and matching algorithms are found.
While there are some works in the area of handwriting individuality for online and
off-line handwriting [82,83] and feature level entropy for online signature verification,
the individuality of a signature, or the biometric entropy of a signature as a biometric
signal, is not assessed to the best of our knowledge. Once determined, the entropy of
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a signature will provide insights on the potential of online signatures as a biometric
identity of the individual.
In this study, we present an individuality model for online signatures using the
Fourier domain representation of a signature. It should be emphasized that unlike
a fingerprint or an iris, a signature may have arbitrary complexity, so this study is
concerned with the entropy of an average signature as found in a large database.
Also an important distinction needs to be made between entropy, which is the topic
of this chapter, and forgeability. As previously brought up by Ballard et al. [92,93],
these two concepts are related but not equal. Entropy in this context refers to how
difficult it is to guess someone’s signature and compares to random forgery tests,
while forgeability refers to how difficult it is to forge someone’s signature and is
measured by false accept rates.
5.2 Background on Online Signature Verification
Signature verification is split into two areas –online and oﬄine– depending on the
type of available data. Online (dynamic) signatures are captured by special hard-
ware (eg. smart pens or pressure sensitive tablets) which is capable of measuring
dynamic properties of a signature in addition to its shape, while the shape is the only
available information in oﬄine signatures. Dynamic information (e.g. pen pressure)
makes the signature more unique and more difficult to forge. Applications of online
signature verification include identity verification in payments using a credit card;
authorization of computer users for accessing sensitive data or programs; authenti-
cation of individuals for accessing physical devices or buildings; and protection of
small personal devices (e.g. PDA, laptop) from unauthorized usage.
Signature verification systems differ both in their feature selection and their
decision methodologies. In fact, more than 70 different feature types have been
used for signature verification [94–96]. These features can be classified in two types:
global and local. Global features are those related to the signature as a whole,
including the signature bounding box dimensions, average signing speed, and signing
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duration. Local features on the other hand are measured or extracted at each point
along the trajectory of the signature. Examples of local features include position,
speed, curvature and pressure at each point on the signature trajectory. In [94], some
of these features are compared in order to find the more robust ones for signature
verification purposes. Other systems have used genetic algorithms to find the most
useful features [97].
Genuine signatures of a person often differ in length due to the natural variations
in signing speed. The advantage of global features is that there are a fixed number
of measurements (features) per signature, regardless of the signature length; this
makes the comparison of two signatures a relatively straightforward task. When
local features are used, one needs to use methods which are suitable to compare
feature vectors of different lengths: for instance the dynamic time warping algorithm
[94, 96, 98–100] or Hidden Markov Models [101]. These latter methods are more
complicated than relatively simple metrics using global features, but they are usually
more successful as well. A comprehensive survey of signature verification can be
found in [102,103].
Due to the differences in databases and forgery qualities, comparing reported
performance results has been difficult. The First International Signature Verification
Competition (SVC2004), organized in 2004, provided a common test set and tested
more than 15 online signature verification systems from industry and academia.
The results of this competition indicate state-of-the-art results of 2.6% equal error
rate (EER) in skilled forgery detection and 1.85% equal error rate in random forgery
detection tasks [104]. While the participants’ identities were kept confidential except
for the winners, our system, later described in [98], was declared as the winning
system for its performance in the skilled forgery test.
5.3 Previous Work on Biometric Individuality
The individuality studies on fingerprint [88,89] and iris [20] modalities have consti-
tuted the starting points of this work: Pankanti et al. [88] provides a broad overview
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of research done on fingerprint individuality, as well as proposing their own individ-
uality model. Their model is based on minutiae representation of the fingerprint and
individuality is modeled by the probability of false correspondence between two un-
related fingerprints’ minutiae: two fingerprints are considered similar if they match
in at least k minutiae points after appropriate alignment. In turn, two correspond-
ing minutiae are accepted as matching if both their locations and orientations are
substantially similar. The probability of match between two arbitrary fingerprints
in at least k minutiae points is modeled by the hypergeometric distribution. Pa-
rameters which govern the proposed model are estimated using a large fingerprint
database. Using the proposed model, authors estimated that the probability of false
correspondence in at least 12 minutiae points between two arbitrary fingerprints
each containing 36 minutiae, is 6× 10−8.
Later, Chen et al. [89] argued that Pankanti et al. made some simplifying and
optimistic assumptions regarding minutiae properties, in particular regarding dis-
tribution of minutiae points as well as dependency between minutiae locations and
their corresponding ridge orientations. In their work, they refined these assumptions
and estimated more conservatively that the probability of false correspondence in
at least 12 minutiae points between two arbitrary fingerprints each containing 36
minutiae, is 4.1× 10−4. Authors also demonstrate that, the probability distribution
of impostor minutiae matching obtained using their model has a very good fit to
the empirically obtained distribution, more so than any previous results.
Daugman developed one of the most successful iris recognition methods [20] using
a 2048-bit representation of the iris (iriscode) which are simply matched using the
Hamming distance. In order to assess iris entropy, he first empirically calculated the
Hamming distance distributions of genuine and impostor irises by cross matching
1800 iris samples. Then, noting that a Binomial distribution with 173 bits of freedom
fits very well to the above mentioned impostor distribution, Daugman concluded
that each iris carries 173 bits of information (reduced from 2048 due to correlation
between the bits in the IrisCode). In other words, his estimate for the probability
of two unrelated irises to match is approximately 10−52 (= 2−173).
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Srihari et al. [82,83] aimed to empirically assess the individuality of handwriting
as a biometric. To do so, they automatically extracted features from the grayscale
images of handwritings and used the false accept and false reject rates as an estimate
of individuality. Authors reported a 95% accuracy rate (or 5% false accept rate)
for verification and 80% accuracy rate for identification of unknown document from
a comprehensive database of 1000 different writers. However, as mentioned before
FAR and FRR numbers do not extend beyond the scope of the particular database
and matching algorithm used, thus falling short of truly estimating the individuality
of the biometric modality.
On a more related study, Vielhauer et al. proposed a method for obtaining a
biometric hash using online signatures [86, 87]. The method is based on adaptive
quantization where extracted features are quantized into bins and the biometric hash
is obtained by concatenation of the integer values representing each bin. Within this
context, they analyzed the stability and entropy of 50 different features obtained
from online signatures. To calculate stability, they measured the deviation of each
feature within handwritings for a particular person and generalized across their test
data set. For the entropy they calculated the average entropy of each feature. The
highest feature entropy was calculated as 3.61 bits and only 17 other feature had
entropy higher than 1.8 bits. Authors did not report total entropy of a signature.
Ballard et al. [92,93] implemented the system proposed by Vielhauer et al., with
the aim of showing that a signature verification system could be compromised using
synthetic forgeries generated using statistics obtained from the general population.
Authors argued that the original approach proposed for the assessment of feature
suitability did not represent susceptibility to forgery attacks. In other words, a
feature may possess high entropy and stability, but may not be difficult to forge.
For that reason, they analyzed 144 different features altogether and decided to use
only 37 of these in the context of biometric hashing. While the original biometric
hash implementation required exact match between all corresponding hash elements,
Ballard et al. assumed that the biometric hash can be corrected if only a few
features don’t quantize into desired bins, either by search or by use of error correction
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codes. They report 6.8% and 8.2% equal error rate (EER) when the system is tested
using forgery signatures provided by untrained forgers who had access to oﬄine and
online renderings of the signatures, respectively. Finally, the system performed at
20.1% and 17.2% of EER when tested using forgeries provided by skilled forgers and
synthetic signatures, respectively.
Feng and Wah proposed a private key generation method using online signatures
[30]. The method is based on feature quantization and used only dynamic features
of a signature. First, the range of each feature is calculated across all subjects to
obtain database boundaries for that feature. During enrollment, user boundaries
are found similarly and the database range for each feature is divided into bins of
size equal to the user’s range. Then, the indices of the bins where the user’s features
are mapped, are concatenated into a single vector from which the cryptographic
hash value is calculated. In other words, quantization is done adaptively for each
user. The hash value is then used to calculate a private key for that user. Authors
report a performance of 8% equal error rate in generating the keys. They also
analyze the entropy of each feature and conclude that online signatures contain on
average 40 bits of entropy, calculated as the sum of individual feature entropies.
Since the features may not be independent, this estimate of the signature entropy
is an overestimate.
Brault and Plamandon attempted to quantitatively assess the complexity of a
given signature [74], in terms of how easy it would be to forge it. The complexity cal-
culation is based on the model of a human perception of a signature. It is assumed
that a forger mentally/perceptually slices given signature according to its corre-
sponding singular points (such as high curvature, etc.). So the difficulty of forging
that signature depends on the cumulative complexity of reproducing each such slice,
normalized by the signature’s curvilinear length. The complexity of a given slice in
turn depends on its curvilinear length and time required to reproduce that slice, as
well as its average angle. This complexity coefficient was compared to forger’s per-
ception of difficulty, expert’s opinion, and a dynamic time warping based distance
measure between the forgery and forged signatures. The calculated complexity was
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not strongly correlated with these measures, while the agreement between forgers’
perception and the automatically calculated distance measure was strong. A similar
study was performed by Elliott and Hunt [105] where they conducted a survey in
order to assess perceptual difficulty of forging certain signatures. They showed a
number of signatures to each forger and asked them to rate the difficulty of forging
those signatures and classify them according to the signing speed. However, it was
observed that the forgers’ perception on both counts were significantly different from
those of genuine owners of the signature.
As summarized above, the individuality or discriminative power of an online
signature is mainly addressed at feature level, whereas more conclusive studies are
done for fingerprint and iris modalities.
5.4 Proposed Signature Individuality Model
In a previous work [106], we explored the use of Fourier Descriptors for on-line signa-
ture verification. In particular we have showed that normalized Fourier Transform
coefficients of a signature’s y-profile (y-component of the signature’s trajectory)
could be used in online signature verification. The Fourier coefficients of a signature
are global features which are attractive because one can represent a variable-length
signature with a fixed number of features.
In section 5.4.1, we broadly describe this approach as it forms the basis of the
proposed signature individuality model. A slight modification is made to the original
matching algorithm in order to obtain an algorithm more amenable for comparison
with the theoretical model. In the following sections we explaining feature extrac-
tion, matching, the proposed individuality model, the parameter estimation and
obtained results (Sections 5.4.3-5.4.5).
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5.4.1 Feature Extraction Using the Global Fourier Trans-
form
An online signature can be represented as a complex signal in time dimension,
specifying the x and y coordinates and optionally other features such as the pressure
and time stamp, for each sampled point:
S(t) =
[
x(t) y(t) pressure(t) timestamp(t)
]T
t = 1, 2, ..., N
where N is the number of points sampled along the signature’s trajectory.
In this work, we apply the Fourier Transform to the y-profile of the signature
which is composed of the y-coordinates of the sampled points (i.e. y(t)), discarding
the additional information. The x-profile is discarded for simplicity because for
signatures which are signed from left to right or right to left, the x-profile does not
contain much discriminative information. Figure 5.1 depicts corresponding y and x
profiles of three different signatures.
Figure 5.1: Two sample signatures (leftmost column) and their corresponding y (middle
column) and x (rightmost column) coordinate profiles.
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The Fourier Transform coefficients of a discrete signal y(t) of length N is defined
as follows:
Ck =
1
N
N−1∑
t=0
y(t)e−j2pitk/N k = 0, 1..., N − 1 (5.1)
In our case, y(t) is the y-profile of the signature, N is the number of points in the
signature and Ck is the k’th Fourier coefficient corresponding to the k’th harmonic.
Given a complex coefficient Ck = ak + jbk, the magnitude of the coefficient, |Ck| =√
a2k + b
2
k indicates the energy for the k’th harmonic, while tan
−1(bk/ak) indicates
its phase.
In 2D shape recognition, the Fourier Coefficients obtained by applying the Fourier
Transform to the object’s contour (x(t),y(t)) can be normalized to achieve invariance
against translation, rotation and scaling of the original shape [107]. For instance,
translation of a shape corresponds to adding a constant term to each point of the
original shape and affects (only) the first Fourier coefficient. By discarding C0 and
using the magnitudes of the remaining coefficients as features, we obtain invariance
to translation (position of the signature on the tablet) and rotation(orientation rel-
ative to the tablet). Scale invariance is more complicated, due to the additional
dimension of time. We have found that a robust approach to normalizing for scale
variations is to divide each coefficient by the total amplitude of the Fourier Spec-
trum. Hence, our final features, also called the Fourier Descriptors, are obtained by
normalizing the magnitudes of the Fourier coefficients Ck:
Fk =
|Ck|∑N−1
i=0 |Ci|
k = 1..., N − 1 (5.2)
Due to the natural variation in the signing process, genuine signatures of the
same user almost never have equal lengths. The length variation results in Fourier
Transforms with varying number of components; hence feature vectors of varying
lengths. In order to obtain an equal number of Fourier Descriptors which then
would correspond to the same frequencies, we pad each signature to be compared
(reference set + query) with zeros, so as to match the length of the longest signature
in the set, prior to the application of the Fourier Transform. Padding a signature
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with zeros corresponds to padding a signal with zeros in the time domain.
5.4.2 Matching
During enrollment to the system, the user supplies a number of reference signatures
which are used to measure the variation within his/her signatures, so as to set user-
specific thresholds for accepting or rejecting a query signature. During verification,
a subject provides his/her test signature to be compared against the claimed user’s
reference set signatures. After padding the signatures that are to be compared
(i.e. reference and query) to the maximum length of the set, we apply the Fourier
transform to the y-profile of each signature and calculate their corresponding Fourier
Descriptors, as described in Section 5.4.1.
In order to match two signatures while allowing for some variability, we use
quantization. For this, we first calculate the mean value (µk) for each Fourier
Coefficient Fk over the reference set:
µk =
1
R
R∑
i=1
F ik k = 1..., n (5.3)
where F ik denotes the k’th Fourier coefficient of the i’th reference signature, R de-
notes the number of reference signatures, and n denotes the fixed number of Fourier
coefficients calculated for each signature. We then calculate the range of each Fourier
descriptor Fk, by finding the maximum and minimum values of Fk over the whole
database. Next, we adaptively quantize this range into a constant number (t) of
bins such that the mean reference value (µk) is at the center of its corresponding bin.
The bin widths are thus determined so that each coefficient’s range is divided into
exactly t bins (extending the range slightly when necessary to fit t bins). The Fourier
Descriptors can take on any values in [0-1] due to the normalization procedure we
use; but in practice they range in [0-0.3].
Finally, the query signature is accepted if at least m0 out of its n Fourier De-
scriptors fall into the same bin with the corresponding mean of the reference set
(i.e. µk). Figure 5.2 illustrates the matching process, showing a case of match for
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the first harmonic (both query coefficient and the corresponding reference mean fall
into the same bin) and a case of mismatch for the second harmonic.
Figure 5.2: A matching illustration of a query signature to a reference set. The range
of each harmonic (Fi) is divided into a constant number of bins (t). Query signature’s
descriptor (triangle) is said to match its corresponding reference set’s mean (circle) if they
both fall into the same bin, as is the case for F1 but not F2.
The feature extraction and matching algorithms presented here are tested us-
ing the publicly available SUSIG database which contains 1000 enrollment (5 for
each subject) and 3940 test (total of genuine and forgery) signatures provided by
200 subjects [108]. Using a total of 25 feature values (n), and requiring a match
in 13 or more feature values (m0) as dictated by EER performance, we obtained a
14% equal error rate for random forgeries. During the test, we divided each fea-
ture value’s range into 8 bins; the selection of the number of bins is explained in
Section 5.4.4. While these results are inferior to the state-of-the-art (around 3%
EER) [98], it is comparable to those achieved by top-10 systems participated in
the Signature Verification Competition (SVC2004) [104], indicating the potential of
Fourier Descriptors as successful features for online signature verification.
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In fact, the above mentioned matching algorithm is slightly modified from an-
other signature verification system using Fourier descriptors which has a much lower
equal error rate (7.5%) on the same database [106]. The modification is done so that
the similarity of two signatures is based on the total number of matching harmonics,
rather than total distance to the mean features, allowing for an easier theoretical
calculation of the entropy. The reason we have chosen the Fourier domain repre-
sentation is the fact that global features are more amenable for the individuality
analysis compared to local features, as explained in the following section.
5.4.3 The Individuality Model
Online signature doesn’t have a de facto representation: different automated signa-
ture verification systems use different feature sets. This is in contrast to fingerprints,
for which minutiae representation is accepted both by human experts and most of
the automated verification systems.
Our signature individuality model is based on the Fourier domain representa-
tion of the signature’s trajectory as described in the previous section 5.4.1. The
Fourier domain representation is suitable for assessing the individuality of signature
as a biometric since, first of all, because the Fourier Transform coefficients repre-
sent the original signal in a lossless fashion, yet, one can remove the high frequency
components to achieve a more compact and fixed-length representation. How many
components can be removed without affecting the characteristic features is not clear,
however due to our previous studies on signature verification, we are using the first
25 components in the current model. Figure 5.4 demonstrates original and corre-
sponding reconstructed y-profiles of four different signatures. Local features, such
as velocity or relative angle at each point on signature’s trajectory are in general
more useful for verification, as they capture local shape and timing variations [98];
however global features make the task of matching two signatures easier (e.g. typi-
cally a simple Euclidian distance is used). Assessing individuality is also easier with
global features since the number of features is fixed. In contrast, with local features,
the number of features depend on the length of the signature which typically shows
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large variations. As a result, matching algorithms (e.g. dynamic programming) and
costs are highly non-linear, making the analysis a challenging problem.
We base our individuality work on that of original work by Pankanti et al., which
is later improved by Chen et al. Similar to their work, we formulate the individuality
problem as the probability of coincidentally matching a given arbitrary signature.
Using the Fourier domain representation, we first look at the probability of match
in a single harmonic: two signatures are said to match in a given harmonic if their
Fourier descriptors (normalized Fourier coefficient magnitude) for that harmonic are
suitably close. How to judge the proximity of two harmonics given inter and intra-
class variations is the main question here. Similar to what is done in Pankanti et
al., we find the amplitude threshold d0 such that a high percentage of corresponding
genuine coefficients are considered as matching.
Next, we consider the probability of match for am out of n of their corresponding
harmonics. That probability can be modeled using the binomial distribution, which
is formulated as follows:
P (m|n) =
 n
m
 pm(1− p)n−m (5.4)
where p is the probability of match in one harmonic. Here we make the assumption
that the probability p of match for each harmonic is equal. The binomial distribu-
tion provides the discrete probability distribution P (m|n) of obtaining exactly m
successes in a sequence of n independent binary events, also called Bernoulli tri-
als, where the outcome of each trial is either success or failure with corresponding
probabilities of p and 1 − p, respectively. In the context of our model, the success
corresponds to two corresponding coefficients falling into the same bin. Since two
signatures are considered as matching in the case where at least m out of n har-
monics match, the probability of match between two signatures (Pmatch) is the sum
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of probabilities of all such cases:
Pmatch =
n∑
m=m0
P (m|n) (5.5)
where m0 is the minimum accepted number of matching descriptors and n is the
total number of descriptors.
For the time being we assume that the coefficients are uniformly distributed
within the range of the harmonic (i.e. the probability for a coefficient to fall into
a bin is equal for all the bins). In fact, the deviation from uniform distribution is
not that severe and the necessary update for the analysis will be done in the future.
Another shortcoming of the proposed approach may be about the assumption of
independence of the Fourier coefficients of online signatures. One may argue that
these are not independent, thus the matching of coefficients are not independent
events. In that case, the entropy estimate would need to be lowered to take into
account the number of dependent dimensions. While Figure 5.3 and Table 5.4.3
show that the Fourier descriptors corresponding to consecutive frequencies do indeed
have low correlations, the rank analysis of the descriptor matrix show a full rank,
indicating that there is no clear linear dependence between the descriptors. Further
studies would need to be done in order to measure and/or remove more complex or
subtle dependencies, or to extend the model to account for them.
So far we have presented a model depending on a number of parameters which
must be estimated in order to assess the signature’s individuality. In the next section
we estimate these parameters using a large database.
5.4.4 Parameter Estimation
The proposed model is governed by a number of parameters such as i) the number
of harmonics used to represent a signature (n), ii) the probability of coincidentally
matching a single harmonic (p), and iii) the minimum number of matching harmonics
required to consider two signatures as similar (m0). In this section, we discuss
the parameter estimation of the model and assess the individuality of the online
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Figure 5.3: Pairwise distribution of some of the Fourier descriptors, calculated using the
SUSIG database.
signature.
All of the parameter estimations are carried out using a publicly available online
signature database SUSIG [108]. The database was collected using genuine signa-
tures provided by 200 subjects for a total of 3940 genuine and 2000 skilled or highly
skilled forgeries. However, since we are interested in the guessing entropy, we have
only used the random forgery protocol of the database (297,000 random forgeries).
Whenever the system performance is assessed, we set apart 5 reference signatures
for each subject and the rest is used as the corresponding test set.
To estimate p, we looked at the distribution of the distances of Fourier descriptors
over the genuine population; we then selected a match threshold d0 such that 90% of
the genuine pairs are considered as matching. Since different descriptors may have
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F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10
F1 1.00 0.50 0.16 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.19 -0.26 -0.20 -0.24
F2 0.50 1.00 0.41 0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.19 -0.18 -0.22
F3 0.16 0.41 1.00 0.38 0.19 0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.11 -0.14
F4 -0.12 0.08 0.38 1.00 0.42 0.16 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.08
F5 -0.13 -0.06 0.19 0.42 1.00 0.27 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.03
F6 -0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.16 0.27 1.00 0.29 0.16 0.03 0.01
F7 -0.19 -0.15 -0.04 0.05 0.20 0.29 1.00 0.37 0.15 0.11
F8 -0.26 -0.19 -0.12 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.37 1.00 0.31 0.22
F9 -0.20 -0.18 -0.11 -0.01 0.07 0.03 0.15 0.31 1.00 0.30
F10 -0.24 -0.22 -0.14 -0.08 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.22 0.30 1.00
Table 5.1: Correlation matrix for first 10 Fourier descriptors, calculated using the SUSIG
database.
different ranges, we used normalized distances in this process (distances divided by
the range of the harmonic). We found d0 to be 0.126. As a result, we quantize
each descriptor’s range by bins of width d0 = 0.126; hence using 8 (= 1/0.126) bins.
Since we consider two descriptors as matching if they fall within the same bin and
since we use normalized distances, we set p = d0.
Given p, we have two other parameters to estimate, namely the number of har-
monics required to represent a signature (i.e. n) and the number of required match-
ing harmonics (i.e. m0). To do this, we exhaustively searched over all possible n
values, where for a fixed n, we determined m0 as the number of matching coeffi-
cients giving equal error rate (EER). We obtained best results for n = 25, with
corresponding values of m0 = 13 and EER = 14%. Notice that n = 25 is sufficient
for online signatures, as indicated by low reconstruction errors shown in Figure 5.4.
5.4.5 Results
Once these estimated parameters are plugged in to our model, the probability of a
coincidental match (Pmatch) between two signatures is calculated as 2.4×10−6, which
corresponds to an entropy of approximately 19 bits. This estimate is somewhat
optimistic, since the uniform distribution assumption within a given harmonic is
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Figure 5.4: The original 4 y-profiles (red) overlapped with their corresponding recon-
structed versions (blue). The reconstruction is done using the inverse Fourier transform
of the first 25 Fourier coefficients.
actually not valid, but used for simplification. We have in fact calculated that the
average entropy of a single descriptor is about 2.3 bits, which corresponds to a
probability of a single match (p) of approximately 0.2 (1/22.3), assuming uniform
distribution. When we plug this new probability into the entropy estimate for the
whole signature, the probability of a coincidental match becomes 4.7× 10−4, which
corresponds to a more conservative estimate of 11 bits.
Figure 5.5 demonstrates impostor and genuine probability distributions esti-
mated using our model (A and B) and empirically calculated distributions (C and
D) using the matching algorithm explained in the Section 5.4.2 over the SUSIG
database. Specifically, the distributions labeled by A and B depict impostor dis-
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Figure 5.5: Distributions labeled by A and B depict the theoretical estimates for number
of coincidental matches between two signatures using n = 25, k = 13, while p set to
0.126 and 0.2, respectively. Distributions labeled by C and D depict impostor and genuine
distributions obtained from the SUSIG database using the same parameters.
tributions estimated using our model with the probability of match p set to 0.126
and 0.2, respectively. The distributions labeled by C and D represent empirically
calculated impostor and genuine probability distributions obtained using the same
parameters (n = 25, m0 = 13, p = 0.126), respectively. The empirically calculated
impostor distribution (C) is close to that estimated using our model, but shifted
apart by a few coefficients, which we believe is due to the simplifying assumptions
made in deriving the model; in particular, the uniform distribution of the descriptors
among the bins.
5.5 Summary
The uniqueness of a biometric modality determines its discriminative power, as well
as providing insights into its performance when deployed in a large-scale application.
In this work, we proposed a preliminary individuality model for online signa-
tures, where the individuality of the signature is estimated by the probability of
coincidental match between two different signatures. We used the Fourier domain
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representation of the signature to simplify the theoretical analysis. We have esti-
mated the model’s parameters using a large database of online signature and showed
that an average signature possesses between 11-19 bits of entropy, when we make
certain simplifying assumptions. This entropy values correspond to an accidental
match probability of 4.7×10−4 to 2.4×10−6. We also show that the impostor prob-
ability distribution estimated by our model is close to that calculated empirically.
This is a preliminary work in that some simplifying assumptions are made. These
assumptions affect how the theoretical model (i.e. A and B in Figure 5.5) matches
the empirical model (i.e. C) and addresses how good the model is. On the other
hand, there is also the issue that the Fourier domain representation is not a standard
representation for online signatures and the accompanying matcher that is used in
deriving the theoretical entropy formula has a relatively high error rate (i.e. the
overlap between C and D, in Figure 5.5). This, in turn, makes the individuality
model less useful/informative since extrapolating system performance for very large
databases is meaningful when the error is very small. As an example, consider the
case where a system achieves 0% EER on a 1000-people database; in that case, using
theoretical models to claim that the performance with very large databases would be
similar, is very important. Nonetheless, the results are significant given that this is
the first individuality model for online signatures, while previous work mostly dealt
with feature level discriminative capabilities. In fact, while online signatures are
often thought as less secure compared to fingerprints and irises, this work highlights
that online signatures already possess a relatively high level of entropy and as a
behavioral biometric with adjustable complexity, it stands as an important biometric
modality.
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Chapter 6
SUSIG: Online Signature Database
We present a new online signature database (SUSIG). The database consists of two
parts that are collected using different pressure sensitive tablets (one with and the
other without an LCD display). A total of 100 people contributed to each part,
resulting in a database of more than 3000 genuine signatures and 2000 skilled forg-
eries. The genuine signatures in the database are real signatures of the contributors.
In collecting skilled forgeries, forgers were shown the signing process on the moni-
tor and were given a chance to practice. Furthermore, for a subset of the forgeries
(highly skilled forgeries), this animation was mapped onto the LCD screen of the
tablet so that the forgers could trace over the mapped signature. Forgers in this
group were also informed of how close they were to the reference signature, so that
they could improve their forgery quality.
We describe the signature acquisition process and several verification protocols
for this database. We also report the performance of a state-of-the-art signature
verification system using the associated protocols. The results show that the highly
skilled forgery set is significantly more difficult compared to the skilled forgery set,
providing researchers with challenging forgeries. The database is available through
http://biometrics.sabanciuniv.edu.
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6.1 Introduction
In a signature verification system, users are first enrolled by providing signature
samples, called reference signatures. Then, when a user presents a test signature
claiming to be a particular individual, this test signature is compared with the
reference signatures of the claimed identity. If the resulting dissimilarity is below a
certain threshold, the user is said to be verified. In evaluating the performance of
a signature verification system, there are two important factors: the false rejection
rate (FRR) of genuine signatures and the false acceptance rate (FAR) of forgery
signatures. Since the two error rates are inversely related, a commonly reported
performance measure is the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve which
shows how true accept rate (1-FRR) changes with FAR, for different acceptance
thresholds. When only a single performance measure is required, for instance while
comparing different systems, the equal error rate (EER) that denotes the point on
the ROC curve where FAR equals FRR, is often reported.
Since FAR and FRR rates depend on the particular database used in testing a
system, it is important that the database is as realistic as possible. For instance, a
database containing genuine signatures collected in a single session would give an
optimistic estimate of the true error rates (FAR and FRR that would be observed if
the system was deployed in a real application). This is because in real applications,
genuine test signatures are signed over an extended period and thus show higher
dissimilarity to reference signatures in general, compared to those collected along
with the reference set. On the other side, obtaining real forgery signatures is im-
practical, if not impossible, since it requires forgers/criminals who are motivated to
break into the system. Instead, two forgery types have been defined in literature: a
skilled forgery is signed by a person who has had access to a genuine signature for
practice, and a random forgery is signed without having any information about the
signature to be forged. Since a so-called skilled forgery may not actually be skilled
at all, sometimes the term informed forgeries is used to denote those forgeries where
forgers see the signature they are asked to forge, but not necessarily practice enough
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to be called skilled. We use the term skilled forgeries in this database since it bet-
ter represents the efforts and resulting skills acquired by forgers that were asked to
practice before forging.
6.2 Previous Work
Publicly available databases and associated verification protocols make it possible to
objectively compare different verification algorithms. We are aware of 3 large public
databases containing online signatures: the MCYT database [109], the BIOMET
database [110], and the SVC2004 database collected for the First International Sig-
nature Verification Competition [104].
The MCYT database [109] is a large multimodal database containing fingerprint
and handwritten signatures. There are a total of 16500 signatures collected from 330
individuals (a 100-person subpart is made public), with 25 genuine and 25 forgery
signatures collected for each person. The forgeries for each person are provided by
5 other individuals from the database. The signatures are obtained using a Wacom
Intuos tablet with an Ink Pen, providing the x and y-coordinates, pressure, azimuth
and altitude for each point on the trajectory. One shortcoming of this database
is that genuine signatures (reference and test) are obtained in a single session. As
mentioned before, signatures collected in a single session are expected to be more
similar, compared to those collected with time elapse. Another important issue in a
biometric database is the forgery quality. In the MCYT database, forgers observed
only static images of signatures they were forging. While this may be the more
realistic case, it underestimates the forgery quality levels achievable by genuine
impostors who may obtain dynamic information about the signature. Finally, for
this database, timestamps are not provided, so the pen-up durations cannot be
estimated with certainty.
The BIOMET database [110] is also a large multimodal database which contains
data from 5 different modalities: fingerprint, face, voice, hand and on-line hand-
written signature. The database is collected in 3 different campaigns, with 130, 106
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and 91 people. There are 15 genuine signatures and 17 forgery signatures collected
for each person. The forgeries for each person are provided by 5 other individuals
from the database. The signatures are obtained with a Wacom Intuos2 tablet, pro-
viding the x and y-coordinates, pressure, azimuth and altitude for each point on
the trajectory, however different pens were used for the first and last two sessions:
Wacom’s Grip Pen (no visual feedback) was used for the first session and Wacom’s
Ink Pen was used for last two sessions. Using the Ink Pen, subjects could naturally
sign their signatures on an ordinary sheet of paper placed over the tablet. The
forgery signature acquisition process is not explicitly mentioned and there are no
verification protocols associated with this database.
Finally, SVC2004 database [104] is a large database containing signatures from
100 individuals, with 20 genuine and 20 forgery signatures collected for each person,
amounting to a total of 4000 signatures. Genuine signatures are collected in two
different sessions. Forgeries for each person are provided by at least 4 other individ-
uals from the database. The signatures are obtained with a Wacom Intuos tablet.
The main strengths of this database are its size and the availability of benchmark
performance results of various signature verification systems that participated in the
SVC2004 competition. On the other hand, a shortcoming of this database is the
fact that people have not used their real signatures, but instead provided made-up
signatures which they practiced solely for the sake of contributing to the database.
As real signatures are signed through a ballistic motion, made-up signatures would
be expected to have higher variance and consequently cause higher error rates. In
fact, while the average EER results for skilled forgeries reported by SVC2004 is not
high (2.8%), there is a high variation between the EER results of randomized tests
using different genuine signatures as reference set.
6.3 SUSIG Database
Hereafter, we describe a new online signature database, called SUSIG (Sabanci
University Signature database) and associated verification protocols. The database
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aims to address some of the shortcomings of the previous databases and provide one
more public benchmark database to serve the research community. In the following
sections, we describe in detail the database construction as well as its associated
protocols.
The SUSIG database consists of two subcorpora: Visual and Blind. Signatures
in the Visual subcorpus were collected using a pressure sensitive tablet with built-
in LCD display such that people could see their signatures while signing, whereas
no visual feedback was available for the Blind subcorpus. The Blind subcorpus
was collected approximately 4 years before the Visual subcorpus; as a result, the
people who donated to the two subcorpora are mostly different but share similar
demographics, resulting in similar signature complexities.
The signatures in the database are real signatures of the participants, which
often, but not always, include names or abbreviated names of the participants writ-
ten in the Latin alphabet. Samples of the signatures from the Visual and Blind
subcorpora are shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
Figure 6.1: Sample genuine signatures from the SUSIG Visual Subcorpus.
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Figure 6.2: Sample genuine signatures from the SUSIG Blind Subcorpus.
6.4 Signature Acquisition
The signature acquisition hardware that is available in the market can be categorized
into two major groups: i) smart pens and ii) pressure sensitive tablets. Smart pens
generally have force sensors on the pen tip, sensing the movement of the pen and
acquiring the signature trajectory while the pen is moving. On the other hand,
pressure sensitive tablets perceive the pressure exerted by the pen tip on the tablet.
Pressure sensitive tablets themselves can be divided into two groups: those with
visual feedback provided through an LCD display on the tablet and others without
one. Tablets with visual feedback are more comfortable because people can see what
they are signing, while tablets without such capability are cheaper.
Depending on the hardware used, the following features are commonly measured
at each sample point on a signature trajectory: i) x and y coordinates of the pen tip,
ii) pressure exerted by the pen, iii) time stamp, iv) azimuth of the pen (0 − 360o),
v) altitude of the pen (0 − 90o) with respect to the signing surface. Using these
measured features, system developers may extract many other features (such as
velocity, acceleration, etc.) as required by their algorithms [94,95,103,111,112].
For the Blind subcorpus, we used Wacom’s Graphire2 pressure sensitive tablet
and pen. The tablet’s active area is 5.02x3.65 inches with 1000 lines per inch spatial
resolution. The tablet has a sampling rate of 100Hz, recording at each sample point
the x and y coordinates of the signature’s trajectory, pressure (512 levels) and the
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time stamp. Wacom’s pen is featured to capture samples only during the interaction
of the pen tip with the tablet (pen-up times can be identified by the time-stamp
difference).
For the Visual subcorpus, we used Interlink Electronics’s ePad-ink tablet which
has a pressure sensitive LCD screen. The LCD screen dimensions are 3x2.20 inches
with a 300dpi spatial resolution. The tablet has a sampling rate of 100Hz, recording
at each sample point the x and y coordinates of the signature’s trajectory, pressure
(128 levels) and the time stamp.
Each signature in the database is saved as a text file, containing the x and y co-
ordinates, time stamp, and pressure level for each point on the signature trajectory.
6.5 Signature Animation Tool
To collect skilled forgeries (for either subcorpus), we added a simulation module that
animates the signing process of a given signature on the monitor, so that forgers
could see the signature trajectory and the signing speed. Specifically, the animation
tool draws the sample points of the signature in order, ignoring the pen-up durations.
In the case of a complex signature where the signature’s trajectory is not obvious
from its image, this animation provides valuable information to the forger.
In order to collect highly skilled forgeries for the Visual subcorpus, we mapped
this animation onto the built-in LCD display of the tablet and let forgers practice
and forge the signature, by tracing over the mapped reference signature. While the
static image of a signature is much more likely to be compromised, we aimed to
push the limits of the forgery quality so as to simulate a scenario where dynamic
information about a signature is compromised.
6.6 The Visual Subcorpus
The Visual subcorpus consists of signatures donated by 100 people (29 women and
71 men). Most of the subjects were students or faculty members of Sabanci Uni-
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versity, with ages varying between 21 and 52. Each person was briefly informed of
the purpose of the data collection, without further information about the working
principles of an online signature verification system.
The Visual subcorpus was collected in two separate sessions (VS1 and VS2) that
were approximately one week apart. Each person supplied 10 samples of his/her
regular signature in each session, for a total of 20 genuine signatures, without any
constraints on how to sign. Each person was then asked to forge a randomly selected
user’s signature. The forger had a chance to watch the signature’s animation several
times on the monitor and practice it a couple of times before forging. Forgers were
always shown the same reference signature (the first signature of session VS1) of
the selected user, so that they could improve over time. During the practice, the
forgers were also able to see other reference signatures of that user, to understand
the variation among the reference signatures, though this was only used by some
forgers. When they were satisfied with their skill level, forgers provided 5 forgeries
of the signature they were asked to forge. For each subject in the Visual subcorpus,
we thus collected 5 skilled forgeries by someone else from the same corpus.
In collecting what we call highly skilled forgeries, the animation of the reference
signature was not only shown on the monitor, but also mapped onto the LCD screen
of the tablet so that the forgers could trace over, as explained in Section 6.5. For
each subject in the Visual subcorpus, we collected 5 highly skilled forgeries provided
by the same two people. In order to obtain better quality signatures, forgers in this
Figure 6.3: Signature animation done on the built-in tablet used in the Visual Subcorpus.
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group were also informed of how close their forgery was to the reference signatures
of the claimed identity, as feedback. Finally, again for this group, forgeries that
were visibly dissimilar were discarded, to better simulate a true imposter. The
similarity between the forgery signature and the corresponding reference signatures
was measured with the metric used in our benchmark system [98]. This metric
only uses the signature trajectory and the order of the sample points (pressure
and time stamps are not used). Hence, while the feedback depends on the specific
distance metric of the benchmark system, we think that the quality improvement
in subsequent forgeries is absolute since the metric is quite successful in separating
forgeries from genuine signatures.
In summary, 20 genuine signatures and 5 skilled and 5 highly skilled forgeries
were collected for each person in the subcorpus (forming the subsets VS1, VS2, VSF
and VHSF, respectively). Additionally, we have a separate 10-person validation set
(VV) with 10 genuine and 10 forgery signatures per person acquired in a single
session, that can be used to tune system parameters. Table 6.1 summarizes the
Visual subcorpus.
Data Set Type Users Samples/User Size
VS1 Genuine 100 10 1000
VS2 Genuine 100 10 1000
VSF Skilled Forgery 100 5 500
VHSF Highly Skilled Forgery 100 5 500
VV Genuine/Forgery 10 10/10 200
Table 6.1: Summary of the SUSIG Visual Subcorpus. The first 4 rows refer to the same
100 people, but the signature samples in each row are mutually exclusive.
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6.7 The Blind Subcorpus
The Blind subcorpus was collected approximately 4 years before the Visual sub-
corpus and is named as such since the collection was done on a tablet without
visual feedback. The subcorpus consists of signatures donated by 100 individuals
(25 women and 65 men), most of whom were students and faculty members of Sa-
banci University, with ages varying between 20 and 50. Each person was briefly
informed of the purpose of the data collection without further information about
the working principles of an online signature verification system.
Each person was first asked to supply samples of their regular signature on the
provided pressure sensitive tablet, without any constraints on how to sign. First
group of 30 people provided 8 genuine signatures, while the rest of the 70 people
supplied 10 genuine signatures each. People in either group supplied their signatures
in a single session.
Each person was then asked to forge a randomly selected user’s signature. The
forger was given the first reference signature of the selected user; he/she then had
a chance to watch the signature’s animation several times and practiced it a couple
of times before forging it. When they were satisfied with their skill level, forgers
provided 10 forgeries of the signature they were asked to forge. For each subject
in the Blind subcorpus, we thus collected 10 skilled forgeries by one other person
(BSF).
In summary, 8 or 10 genuine signatures and a total of 10 skilled forgeries were
collected for each person in the subcorpus (forming the subsets BS1 and BSF, re-
spectively). Additionally, we have a separate 10-person validation set (BV) with 10
genuine and 10 forgery signatures per person acquired in a single session, that can
be used to tune system parameters. Table 6.7 summarizes the Blind subcorpus.
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Data Set Type Users Samples/User Size
BS1 Genuine 100 8/10 940
BSF Skilled Forgery 100 10 1000
BV Genuine/Forgery 10 10/10 200
Table 6.2: Summary of the SUSIG Blind Subcorpus. The first 2 rows refer to the same
100 people, but the signature samples in each row are mutually exclusive.
6.8 Verification Protocols
In this section, we define verification protocols which should be used while assessing
and reporting system performance results using the SUSIG Database.
A verification protocol is a set of rules which must be followed while assessing
the performance of a system using a certain database. In particular, a protocol
defines which data should be used for enrolling users to a system (reference set),
tuning system specific parameters (validation set) and testing the performance (test
set). In order not to bias performance results, people who provide signatures to the
validation set must not provide any signature to the reference or test sets. Similarly,
signatures from the reference set of a person must not be included in the test set
of that person. It is also essential for an unbiased performance assessment that all
system-wide parameters, in particular those affecting the calculation of similarity
scores, are kept fixed once they are trained using the validation set. The only
exception to this is the threshold used to accept or reject a signature given its
similarity score(s). This threshold may be decreased or increased to reduce FRR or
FAR respectively, so as to find the EER.
The SUSIG verification protocols are designed to test a system’s performance
under various conditions. In the following sections, we define 7 such protocols.
Note that some of the protocols are designed for the sake of completeness and
compatibility with previous databases (e.g. the single session protocol), while others
correspond to more realistic scenarios (e.g. across-session protocol). Each protocol
is applicable to either one of the subcorpora, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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Each protocol uses signatures from one subcorpus, except for the device-independent
protocol. Details of the protocols can be found in Table 6.8, while descriptions and
further explanations are given in sections 6.8 through 6.8.
We have envisioned 5 genuine signatures to be used as reference signatures, as
is the case with the SVC2004 database. However, if a system requires more than 5
reference signatures, most of the protocols may be modified appropriately, adding
more of the genuine test signatures to the reference set.
The SUSIG protocols are designed to be used in an open-set verification format
where new users can be added to or deleted from the system without the need of
re-configuring/re-tuning the system and its verification specific parameters.
Protocol Reference Genuine Test Forgery Test
Visual SubCorpus
Single-Session VS1[1..5] VS1[6..10] VSF+VHSF
VS2[1..5] VS2[6..10] VSF+VHSF
Across-Session VS1[1..5] VS2[1..10] VSF+VHSF
VS2[1..5] VS1[1..10] VSF+VHSF
Base (=MS) VS1[1..5] VS1[6..10]+VS2[1..10] VSF+VHSF
Skilled Forgery VS1[1..5] VS1[6..10]+VS2[1..10] VSF
Highly Skilled Forgery VS1[1..5] VS1[6..10]+VS2[1..10] VHSF
Random Forgery VS1[1..5] VS1[6..10]+VS2[1..10] Others’ genuine sigs.
Blind SubCorpus
Base(=SS/SF) BS1[1..5] BS1[6..8/10] BSF
Random Forgery BS1[1..5] BS1[6..8/10] Others’ genuine sigs.
Whole Database
Device Independent VS1[1..5] BS1[1..8/10] BSF
BS1[1..5] VS1[1..10]+VS2[1..10] VSF+VHSF
Table 6.3: Summary of the Protocols. VS1,VS2,VSF, VHSF, BS1, and BSF refer to the
subsets defined in subsections 6.6 and 6.7. SS, MS, SF refer to Skilled Session, Mixed
Session and Skilled Forgery, respectively. The forgeries in each experiment are obtained
from the corresponding subcorpus only, except for the Whole Database protocols. The
protocols marked in bold are the essential protocols, while the others measure performance
under certain restricted conditions.
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Single-Session Protocol
This protocol assesses the performance of a system under the condition where both
reference and test data are obtained in the same session. The protocol proceeds as
follows: the first 5 genuine signatures of each user are used as reference and the
remaining signatures of the same session are used as test signatures. All available
forgery signatures of the subcorpus are also added to the test set.
For the Visual subcorpus, another test should be run using the signatures in the
second session. Finally, all of the verification results (genuine and forgery scores ob-
tained in the two experiments) should be merged and the EER should be calculated
over the combined results, using a single threshold. This is preferred to averaging
the EER results separately calculated for each experiment, since the reference and
genuine sets of the two experiments are fully disjoint. Note that while the forgery
signatures used in the two experiments are the same, forgery results are not the
same, as the reference sets are different.
This protocol is the base protocol for the Blind subcorpus.
Across-Session Protocol
The goal of this protocol is to assess the performance of a system under the more
realistic conditions where genuine signatures for reference and test sets are obtained
in different time periods. This protocol is applicable only to the Visual subcorpus
where genuine signatures are obtained in two different sessions.
The protocol proceeds as follows: the first 5 genuine signatures of one session
are used as reference and all signatures of the other session, as well as all forgery
signatures, are used as test signatures. After this test, roles of the two sessions must
be interchanged and the EER should be calculated over the combined results of the
two experiments, using a single acceptance threshold.
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Mixed-Session Protocol
The goal of this protocol is to use all available genuine signatures in the Visual
subcorpus; hence, it is a mixture of the single and across-session protocols.
The protocol proceeds as follows: first 5 genuine signatures of the first session are
used as reference and all other genuine signatures (i.e. rest of the first session and
all of the second session) are used as test signatures. All available forgery signatures
are also used as test set. Note that since all genuine data is already used, we do not
run a second experiment where the roles of the two sessions are interchanged.
This protocol is the base protocol for the Visual subcorpus.
Skilled Forgery Protocol
The goal of this protocol is to assess the performance of a system against skilled
forgeries only, discarding highly skilled forgeries. This protocol is applicable to
either subcorpus; however, as there is no highly skilled forgeries in the Blind Sub-
corpus, this protocol is the same as the single session (Base) protocol for the Blind
Subcorpus.
Highly Skilled Forgery Protocol
The goal of this protocol is to assess system performance against highly skilled forg-
eries, only. The protocol is applicable only to the Visual subcorpus, as the Blind
subcorpus doesn’t contain highly skilled forgeries. This protocol is the same as the
base protocol of to the Visual subcorpus, except for the fact that skilled forgeries
are excluded from the test set.
Random Forgery Protocol
The goal of this protocol is to assess system’s performance against a random forgery
attack. In a random forgery attack, forgers don’t have any prior information regard-
ing the signature to be forged; so genuine signatures of all other users are used as
random forgeries for each user.
99
To perform the random forgery test, first 5 genuine signatures of the first session
are used as reference, while the rest of the signatures are used as genuine test
signatures and all the genuine signatures of all other subjects are used as forgery
test signatures. This protocol is applicable to both subcorpora.
Device-Independent Protocol
The goal of this protocol is to test the device-independent performance of a system.
Hence, it uses reference signatures obtained through one sensor, while the test sam-
ples (genuine and forgery) are obtained through another sensor. It is run only for
the 20 people who are common in the two subcorpora.
The protocol proceeds as follows: the first 5 signatures of the Visual subcorpus
is used as reference and the genuine signatures of the same users and all available
forgeries in the Blind subcorpus are used as tests. Then, the first 5 signatures of the
Blind subcorpus is used as reference and the genuine signatures of the same users
in the Visual subcorpus are used as genuine tests. The EER should be calculated
using a single threshold over the two experiments. Any tuning must be done before
the experiments, but it may use either or both of the validation sets.
6.9 Performance Assessment
Systems using the SUSIG database and protocols should report the EER obtained
using a particular protocol. They may also additionally provide ROC or error trade-
off curves of their system, for these protocols. As there are many protocols associ-
ated with the SUSIG database, it would be desirable that the results of the base
protocol(s) are included when reporting results on the SUSIG database.
Note that in addition to reporting the EER value computed exactly as specified
by a particular protocol, it is possible to run cross validation tests in accordance
with the protocol and report mean and standard deviation of the experiments. For
instance, one can randomly choose any 5 signatures of one session as reference (not
necessarily the first 5) and use the remaining genuine signatures of the same session
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and all forgeries, as test signatures. Considering the Single Session protocol of the
Visual subcorpus, one can run as many as 2( 10!
5!5!
) = 504 experiments. However,
given that there are several thousands signatures to test in each protocol, we believe
that the suggested protocols are sufficient, as specified.
6.10 Benchmark Results
In order to comment on the relative difficulties of the various protocols and provide a
benchmark, we report results of our signature verification system [98] on the SUSIG
database. This system is the winner of the First International Signature Verification
Competition, SVC2004 [104].
Table 6.10 lists the EER results of our benchmark system using the SUSIG
protocols. In particular, the results for the base protocol of the Visual Subcorpus is
2.10% ERR. The error-tradeoff curve for this protocol is given in Figure 6.4.
Protocol Subcorpus EER (%)
Single-Session Visual 1.41
Across-Session Visual 2.12
Base Visual 2.10
Skilled Forgery Visual 0.30
Highly Skilled Forg. Visual 3.36
Random Forgery Visual 4.08
Base Blind 2.85
Random Forgery Blind 2.82
Table 6.4: Results of the base system for the SUSIG database and protocols. The protocols
marked in bold are the essential protocols, while the others measure performance under
certain restricted conditions.
As expected, the single session protocol had lower error rate compared to the
across-session protocol (1.41% versus 2.12%) and the base protocol result was a mix
of the single and across-session protocols, as expected. In fact, the base protocol
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result is very close to the across-session protocol (2.10%), but this is not surpris-
ing because there are twice as many genuine signatures from the second session
compared to the first.
Analysis of the results for skilled and highly skilled forgeries (0.3% and 3.36%)
show that highly skilled forgery set is significantly more difficult, which is to be
expected, given the amount of information provided to the forgers while collecting
that set.
The relative difficulty of the Blind subcorpus, as indicated by the results of
comparable protocols (1.41% vs. 2.85% and 0.3% vs. 2.85%) may be attributed to
the lack of visual feedback in the collection of the Blind subcorpus.
Figure 6.4: The error tradeoff curve indicates verification performance for different thresh-
olds using the SUSIG Base Protocol of the Visual subcorpus.
On the other hand, the fact that random forgery results are higher than compara-
ble skilled forgery tests is not very intuitive, since one would expect random forgery
results to be much lower; after all, these are not even true forgeries but other peo-
ple’s genuine signatures. This is partly an artefact of our benchmark system which
puts a significant emphasis on the correct timing of a signature: analysis of the
random forgery errors has shown that intentional forgeries in the skilled and highly
skilled sets are on average twice longer in duration compared to genuine signatures.
Also, we have found that for some people with highly varying signatures, random
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forgeries are as likely to be accepted as the highly skilled forgeries. In particular, 2
people out of 100 account for more than 10% of all the false accepts in the random
forgery test.
Task Average EER (%)
SVC2004 (Task1-Skilled) 2.84
SVC2004 (Task2-Skilled) 2.89
SVC2004 (Task1-Random) 2.79
SVC2004 (Task1-Random) 2.51
Table 6.5: Average EER obtained by our benchmark system in the SVC2004 competition.
In order to give some perspective on the results obtained with the SUSIG proto-
cols, we also provide the results obtained by our benchmark system in the SVC2004
competition [104], summarized in Table 6.10. The SVC2004 database consists of
made-up signatures which the contributors practiced solely for the sake of this
database. In other aspects (size, number of sessions, tablet), the database is similar
to the Blind Subcorpus, as explained in Section 6.2. The SVC2004 competition had
two tasks: in Task1, competitors were given only the coordinate information for a
signature, while in Task2 more features were supplied (coordinate, timestamp, az-
imuth, altitude, and pressure information). Our system was the winner of the skilled
forgery tests of both tasks, with 2.84% and 2.89% average equal error rates over ran-
dom trials using different genuine signatures as reference. The system ranked fourth
and second in the random forgery tests of Task1 and Task2, with 2.79% and 2.51%
average equal error rates, respectively. These results are quite similar to the results
obtained in the the comparable protocols (base and random forgery protocols) of
the Blind subcorpus.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show sample signatures that are very consistent and difficult
to forge and signatures that are inconsistent and consequently easier to forge. The
consistent group had zero false accept in random and skilled forgery tests listed in
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Figure 6.5: Sample genuine signatures of 3 subjects who are very consistent; these subjects
were not forged at all in random or skilled forgery tests.
Table 6.10 while the inconsistent group had an average of 34.53% FAR (910, 663
and 478 false accepts out of 99x20=1980 random forgery attacks. This comparison
highlights the fact that signature is a biometric with varying and adjustable com-
plexity. Assuming that a person can be consistent in his/her signatures with some
care, one could increase the complexity of his/her signature (duration, number of
strokes etc.) and make it more difficult to forge, for higher security applications.
Figure 6.6: Sample genuine signatures of 3 subjects who are very inconsistent; these
subjects had a high false accept rate. These signatures were forged 910, 663 and 478
times, from top to bottom, in 1980 random forgery attacks for each.
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6.11 Summary
In this part of the thesis, an online signature database and associated protocols are
presented. The database consists of two parts: the Visual subcorpus is collected
using a pressure sensitive pad with a built-in LCD screen and consists of signatures
provided by 100 subjects, for a total of 3000 signatures (2000 genuine and 1000
forgery). The Blind subcorpus is collected using a pressure sensitive tablet without
an LCD screen. Each subject in this part provided 8 to 10 genuine signatures,
for a total of 1940 signatures (940 genuine and 1000 forgery). Together with the
validation data which is separate, the overall database contains slightly over 5000
signatures.
Signatures in the database are real signatures of the contributors, as opposed
to made-up ones. Furthermore, signatures are collected over two different sessions,
with at least one week delay between the sessions. Availability of real signatures
and the fact that genuine signatures were not collected in a single session, make the
database more realistic compared to some of the existing databases.
The method used to collect highly skilled forgeries is novel and found to result
in challenging forgeries. Specifically, we developed a signature animation tool that
animates the signature to be forged on the LCD screen of the tablet such that the
forger can trace over the signature. We also provided a degree of similarity between
forgeries and the corresponding reference sets so that forgers could improve over
time. This highly skilled forgery set has significantly higher error rates compared to
the skilled forgery set, thus providing researchers with more challenging forgeries.
Note that since we cannot obtain real forgeries, the best we can do is to improve
the forgery qualities.
Together with this database, we have established a set of protocols, paralleling
other databases and common practice, so as to provide a benchmark for all needs
(e.g. single-session protocol, multi-session protocol etc.). These clearly specified
protocols will help in comparing performances of different systems.
Finally, to provide a benchmark, we measured the performance of our own system
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[98] on the database and associated protocols. This system obtained 2.10% and
2.85% EER on the base protocols of the Visual and Blind Subcorpora, respectively.
The same system obtained similar results with average equal error rates of 2.86%
and 2.89% on the skilled forgery tests in SVC2004 [104].
One may argue that the lack of the azimuth and altitude features constitute
a shortcoming for the SUSIG database. However, tablets with these features are
relatively less common. Also, given the fact that the EER results obtained in Task2
of SVC2004 (where these features were provided), are similar to that of Task1 (co-
ordinate information only), one may argue that they are not too important after
all.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Contributions
Biometric authentication systems are gaining popularity and being widely deployed.
Such systems are being preferred over the traditional password and token-based au-
thentication schemes, due to the security and convenience they provide. However
there are increased concerns over the loss of privacy and potential misuse of bio-
metric data. Major concerns are due to the facts that: i) strong biometrics (eg.
iris, fingerprint) are highly unique to a person thus can be used for tracking in-
dividuals and their behavior, ii) biometric data kept in central databases may be
compromised, which is a serious concern given the fact that if a biometric trait is
stolen or compromised it can not be reissued or canceled, and iii) biometric data
may disclose sensitive information such as race, gender and health problems. In this
dissertation we addressed privacy concerns associated with biometrics systems and
proposed practical solutions to alleviate some of the existing problems.
One of the main contributions of this thesis is the proposal of a novel privacy
enhancing biometric authentication framework that is based on the idea of com-
bining multiple biometrics to enhance both privacy and security. Specifically, two
biometric traits (e.g. two fingerprints) are combined at the template level, in or-
der to obtain a non-unique biometric identifier for a person. We demonstrated two
different realizations of this framework; using two separate fingerprints in the first
one and combining fingerprint and voice in the second one. We empirically showed
that both realizations of the framework are more successful compared to their single
biometric counterparts, while privacy is preserved to a large extent. The privacy is
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measured as the ratio of the correct templates returned (precision) when searching
the template database using only a single biometric trait. In other words, we have
shown that using a single biometric trait, we cannot reliably locate the correct multi-
biometric template created with this scheme. Furthermore, these multi-biometric
identifiers are more successful in identity verification compared with single biometric
counterparts. Finally, if compromised, multi-biometric identifiers can be revoked by
providing different pairs of traits. This is especially true for the fingerprint and voice
combination, since voice utterances can naturally incorporate a password. Likewise,
different identifiers can be generated for different security applications, which will
result in different identifiers. Since non-unique identifiers cannot be used for linking
separate biometric databases, this eliminates concerns of tracking of personal activ-
ity through the use of biometrics. One another important property of our framework
is that it can be used in applications requiring authorization of multiple users (eg.
authorization of both husband and wife to withdraw money from shared bank ac-
count). In this case, the multi-biometric identifier is simply constructed from the
biometrics of each party.
Another contribution of the thesis is the work done around the Fuzzy Vault
scheme, which emerged as a privacy preserving framework that can be applied
to biometrics. As applied to biometrics, it successfully combines biometrics and
cryptography in order to get the benefits of both fields; while biometrics provides
non-repudiation and convenience, cryptography guarantees privacy (based on the
difficulty of the polynomial reconstruction problem) and adjustable levels of secu-
rity. We have done a straightforward extension of the first implementation of the
Fuzzy Vault using fingerprints, as well as providing the first realization using online
signatures.
Apart form single person authentication, there are circumstances requiring pres-
ence of multiple users to initiate certain services or get access to a particular entity.
In the cryptographic realm, such scenarios are called secret sharing. We demon-
strated how the Fuzzy Vault scheme can be used for secret sharing, using biometric
traits. Specifically, we showed that the key which is locked in a fuzzy vault using
108
the fingerprints of multiple people, can only be released when the required number
of people present their individual biometrics.
Our last contribution in the area of Fuzzy Vault, is the empirical substantiation
of a recent claim that the Fuzzy Vault scheme is susceptible to the correlation
attacks, revealing the biometric traits if two different fuzzy vaults, created using
same biometric trait but different chaff points, are intercepted. We implemented
this attack, which involved non-trivial steps, and showed that the claim is indeed
substantiated.
The discriminative capability of a biometric modality is based on its entropy
and is an important factor in choosing a biometric for a large-scale deployment or
a cryptographic application. Signature is a widely accepted and frequently adopted
biometric trait. In order to further substantiate their applicability in biometric
verification systems, we developed an individuality model for online signatures. We
build our model on the probability of coincidence match between two arbitrary
signatures. We proposed the Fourier domain representation of the signature along
with a non-trivial matching algorithm to ease probability estimations. Using a large
signature database, we estimated model parameters and demonstrated using this
preliminary individuality model that an average online signature has a high level of
complexity.
Throughout our signature related research we have collected a large online sig-
nature database. This database and associated protocols are made public to serve
the research community. The protocols we have established are comprehensive and
well-defined, and aim to be used in testing different biometric verification problems.
For this database, we have devised a method to increase the quality of forgeries, so
as to have more challenging forgeries. Finally, we have published the results of our
online signature verification algorithm on this database, to provide a benchmark.
The collection of such databases is time and budget consuming, but they are crucial
in order to objectively assess performance results of different methods; as such, this
constitutes a smaller contribution of this thesis.
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